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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
FLEMING JAMES, JRJt
GENERAL RuLE-ITs HISTORY AND EXPLANATIONS
IN an action based on negligence, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is a complete defense. So would run a general statement of the rule still
widely prevailing in this country,' though, as we shall see, it must be taken
with many qualifications. 2 For present purposes it is enough to notice that,
even as thus simply formulated, the rule has two aspects: (1) that a plaintiff's
contributory negligence will affect his recovery in an action for negligence;
(2) that it will affect recovery to the extent of being a complete bar to de-
fendant's liability in the action. In seeking the explanation and justification
of the rule, from the point of view of both history and policy, it must con-
stantly be borne in mind that there is no inherent logical or practical reason
why the second aspect of the rule must accompany the first. It would of course
be perfectly possible to have a rule of liability in which the plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence would not count at all (as under workmen's compensation
statutes and in many situations under the common law). But it would also
be possible to have a rule that contributory negligence would diminish, but
not defeat plaintiff's recovery. 3 Probably the modern trend, both of judicial
decision and of legislation, is towards one or the other of these alternative
solutions to the problem.4 But before we can fully understand or appraise this
trend we should first inquire into the reasons why the all-or-nothing (or stale-
mate) rule came to dominate Anglo-American law.
tLafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The author gratefully
ackmowledges the assistance rendered by Mr. Gerald G. Schulsinger, Class of 1954, Yale
Law School.
A modified version of this Article will appear in a forthcoming textbook on the law of
torts by Professor Fowler V. Harper and the present author.
1. "Except as stated in §§ 479 and 480, the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars
recovery against a defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable
to the plaintiff for the harm sustained by him." REsTAmmNT, To.as §467 (1934).
(§§ 479 and 480 concern "last clear chance" situations.)
2. See pages 706 et seq. infra.
3. E.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1903), as amended, 53 STAT.
1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1946). See pages 731 et $eq. infra.
4. See, e.g., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L REv. 465 (1953); Turk,
Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.KENT RE%, 189, 304 (1950) ; Leflar, Thc
Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 Am. L REv. 1 (1946).
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Historical Background
Contributory negligence is a relatively late comer on the scene of our legal
history. Most writers put its entry at 1809 with the now famous English case
of Butterfield v. Forrester. Thereafter the doctrine was received in America
hospitably enough;6 but in the important State of New York, for instance,
it was not until mid-century (1850) and the rise of industrial enterprise (par-
ticularly railroading) that the rule really assumed significance and began to
come into its own.7 Yet in spite of its novelty the announcement of the doc-
trine caused no stir at the time (as has often been noted), and was made with
the off-hand manner of judges who are treading on familiar ground.8
In this connection we must remember that the concept of negligence, as an
independent ground of legal liability, was itself a fairly late arrival in our law
and was just beginning to take clear shape in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries.9 But earlier law had been much concerned with causation-
5. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926' (K.B. 1809). D negligently laid a pole across the
highway and P ran into it, although he might have avoided doing so had he not beei
"riding violently." Said Lord Ellenborough, C.J.: "A party is not to cast himself upon
an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another and avail himself of It, if lie
do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right .... One person being
in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself." The case illts-
trates the casualness with which the doctrine slipped into the common law. Professor
Bohlen comments of it: "There is ...no discussion of general principles, no logical
argument applying such principles to the particular facts and showing that they necessitate
the result reached by the court. All attempts to ascertain upon what legal principle tile
defense of contributory negligence is based, are therefore effort ex post facto, to explain
and account for a result already reached apparently unconsciously." Bohlen, Contributory
Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REv. 233 (1908).
6. Turk dates its American debut at 1824, with the case of Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass.
(2 Pick.) 621 (1824). Turk, supra note 4, at 198. The earliest reference in American treatises
is a cursory observation in the 1811 American edition of Selwyn's Law of Nisi P1ius that
a plaintiff seeking to recover damages must show that he had acted with "common and
ordinary caution," for which Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926
(KB. 1809), is cited as authority. 2 SELWYN, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW or Nist PRIs
1092 n.5 (1st Am. ed. 1811).
The reception accorded the new doctrine in Louisiana is noteworthy, as Louisiana, In
common with other civil law jurisdictions, had been moving toward a doctrine of com-
parative negligence in the first part of the century. See Malone, Comparative Neglkyence
-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945) ; Malone, The Formatwve
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946).
7. Id. at 152-5.
8. See note 5 supra; and compare the following statement: "It has been a rule of law
from time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in all time to come, that there can
be no recovery for an injury caused by the mutual default of both parties," Black, CJ.,
in Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149-50 (1854).
9. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REV. 184
(1926); 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446-59 (2d cd. 1937) (hereinafter
cited as HoLDswoRTH; edition number and date for the volume will be given only when
the volume is first cited). Cf. 3 HOLDSwORTH 375 et seq. (5th ed. 1942) (early medieval
civil liability); BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND CoMMou LAW 284-8 (1936)
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indeed it was probably through the development of the concept of causation
that the modem notion of negligence emerged.' And medieval lawyers had
been quite familiar with the defense that the cause of the harm was plaintiff's
own act." To be sure, contributory negligence (with its implication of a con-
currence of causation) would be a poor thing to call such a defense. "Rather,
[plaintiff] failed to recover because his own act had been the direct cause of
the accident."' ' Moreover, "the notion of negligence had not yet arisen."' 1
Yet it was probably because of this heritage that the concept seemed so familiar
to the profession. Early statements of the rule abound in language referring
it to principles of cause.' 4
The hypothesis as to the rule's heritage put forth in the last paragraph would
help to explain why the rule, when it came, took the all-or-nothing form rather
than one simply diminishing damages. Earlier legal thinking had been very
much dominated, though perhaps never exclusively, by the notion that while
there may be many causes of an injury in a lay or scientific sense, yet the law
should quest for a sole or principal proximate cause. In a recent article, Lord
XNrright suggests that the form the rule took was more probably "due to pro-
(negligence in Roman law). Traces of a contributory negligence ductrine have heerl
recognized in Roman law by some commentators. See 8 HoLDswoTi 459. Ptl cf. Bohlen,
supra note 5, at 252 n.2. The point is discussed in BUCRLAN;D & MCNAI, op. Cit. sntlra at
288, and documented in PoLLocK, Toars App. D 592 (11th ed. 1920).
10. 8 HOLDSWORTH 449 et seq.
11. 3 HoL'swoRTH 377-SO; 8 id. at 459-62.
12. Turk, supra note 4, at 196.
13. Ibid.
14. Thus in Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 6S5 (K.B. 1793), Lord Kenyon charged the
jury that if plaintiff crossed over to the side of the road where defendant (wrongfully)
was, simply to assert his right of way, "the injury ras of his own seedng:' In Butter-
field v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, (KB. IS9), Bayley, J., said: "If he
[plaintiff] had used ordinary care he must have seen the obstruction; so that the accident
appeared to happen entirel, from his o zw fault." (Emphasis supplied.) In Flower v.
Adam, 2 Taunt. 314 (C.P. 1810), 'Mansfield, CJ., thought the defendant's wrong "to-
remote to affect him"; and Lawrence, J., stated that "the immediate and proximate cause
is the unskillfulness of the driver." In Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry., 3 M. & V. 244
(Ex. 1838), the court held bad in substance a plea that the injury was caused "in part hy
and through the.. . carelessness" of plaintiff's driver, "as well as in part by and thrw'gh
the... carelessness" of defendant. Parke, B., explained that plaintiff's negligence would
bar him only if by ordinary care he might have avoided the consequences of defendant's
negligence, for then "he is the author of his own wrong."
No doubt the transition from the older heritage to the newer idea was made easier by,
the historical accident that in all the earliest cases of contributory negligence plaintiff-,
negligence came later in time than defendant's (i.e., it lay in failing to avoid the danger
created by defendant's wrong). Thus in all of them plaintiff's act was the more direct or
immediate cause of the harm. And since there was a distinct tendency in earlier law t.o
regard the last wrongful act of a responsible human being as the sole proximate cause of
injury, contributory negligence came in as simply a natural and logical application Lf th
last wrongdoer rule. See 8 HoLswoarHr 459, 460, 4o2; Bohlen, supra note 5, at 22!;
James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (193S).
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cedural or pleading points .... The plaintiff could declare upon the defendant's
negligence ... or nuisance .... Against this declaration, the defendant would
plead the general issue .... and that was a sufficient plea to entitle him to show
that the accident was in part due to the plaintiff's own negligence; thus the
plaintiff who had alleged that the accident was due to the defendant's negli-
geizce failed."15 But the point is lost unless we assume, as Lord Wright does,
that plaintiff's allegation that his injury was "due to the defendant's negli-
gence" could only have meant that it was due solely to that cause. Once grant
the possibility of multiple proximate causes and Lord Wright's pleading logic
collapses.' 6 What the point really shows then is that the habit of thinking in
terms of a single legal cause too often underlay procedural as well as sub-
stantive law.
Another factor which may have contributed to the all-or-nothing form of
the rule was the nearly complete lack of precedent for any alternative solu-
tion, except perhaps in maritime law.17 It is probable that neither ancient
law Is nor contemporaneous continental European law 19 had developed any
well defined procedure for dividing or apportioning loss in these situations.
15. Lord Wright, Contributory Negligence, 13 MOD. L. REv. 2, 5 (1950) (emphasis
supplied).
Compare Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 A-. L Rsv. 201 (1870).
16. As I understand it, there runs through the whole of this article a strange com-
pulsion to find a single "efficient, proximate or decisive" cause. The last opportunity rule
is criticized only because it assumes that the last cause is always the decisive one. Lord
Wright believes that its position in the time sequence is only one factor in deciding
whether a cause is decisive. Yet he would find a decisive one as between plaintiff and
defendant in many situations where the conduct of each would quickly be found a proxi-
mate cause of injury to any third person injured by the accident. The net effect of Lord
Wright's thesis would be a great cutting down of the recent comparative negligence legis-
lation in England. Contrast the attitude in WU.LIAMxs, JOINT TORTS AND CoNRuUToRY
NEGLIGENCE § 62 (1951) and passim.
17. Traces of a proportional damages rule, later to be articulated into the compara-
tive negligence doctrine now prevailing in admiralty jurisdictions, may be found in medi-
eval maritime law. The genesis and growth of the doctrine in the admiralty courts are
described in Turk, supra note 4, at 218 et seq. See also references cited in SANVORN,
ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLIsH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW 117-8 (1930). A study
of later admiralty developments in respect to proportional damages is presented in Franck,
Collisions at Sea in Relation to International Maritime Law, 12 L.Q, REv. 260 (1896),
and a supplementary article by the same author in 42 L.Q. REV. 25 (1926).
18. Turk, supra note 4, at 208-18, and sources therein cited. Hillyer, however, sug-
gests that while English authorities have read into Roman law the all-or-nothing form of
contributory negligence, continental commentators have found in Roman law the rudiments
of a proportional damages doctrine. Hillyer, Comparative Negligence in Louisiana, 11
TULANE L. Rzv. 112, 119-21 (1936). Compare also Philbrick, Loss Apportionent it
Negligence Cases, 99 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 572, 766, 799 (1951) (rule of proportional damages
"a rule more than two thousand years old").
19. Although a basis for proportional damages may be found in the 1784 Prussian
Code and the Napoleonic Code of 1804, the major codifications of proportional damages
rules occur later in the 19th century. See Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Neg-
ligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 337-8 (1932) ; Turk, supra note 4, at 238 et seq.
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Doctrinal history alone, however, could scarcely account for so important
a rule as contributory negligence in its entirety, though it might give it shape.
It is very significant that during the nineteenth century tort lav., in practice
was becoming very much involved with the course of the industrial revolution
and the rise of business and industrial enterprise. The accidents of an earlier
day had been pretty much occurrences between neighbor and neighbur. As the
nineteenth century progressed they became increasingly the casualties of the
newer system. The man of broad outlook began to perceive that liability for
such accidents was a burden upon that system.20 The typical juryman, on the
other hand, began to look on such accidents as misfortunes caused to men like
himself by something impersonal, perhaps "foreign," and presumably rich:
and juries became "incurably plaintiff minded." 2'
The economic developments of the times were accompanied by the growth of
an individualistic political and economic philosophy which regarded as a great
social good freedom of action, in nearly all directions, particularly on the part
of the entrepreneurial class. Naturally this philosophy would decry the placing
of serious burdens on the new and promising system and would deplore the
tendency of juries to lose sight of broader philosophical objectives in their
20. The early 19th century in England was an era in which familiar and relatively
safe industrial and agricultural techniques were replaced by strange and not yet perfected
machinery with a far greater potentiality for danger. "The railroad, the steamboat, the
saw mill, the cotton gin, the factories of all descriptions, gave the new legal setup all the
work it could do." Green, The Dtdy Problem in Negligence Cases, 29 CoL. L RE. 255,
260 (1929).
Compounding the costs of industrialization was a rapid and mass migratioln from rural
areas into urban centers, where an expanding industry sopped up the surplus of a declin-
ing agricultural economy. The new proletariat concentrated in unsanitary and hazardous
"factory towns," built to meet the momentary needs of a new industrial employer class as
yet unfettered by the paternalistic sense of social responsibility which had characterized
its land-owning predecessors. See TREvELYAN, ENGLISH SOcLaL Hisowon C. xv (2d ed.
1946). Social tensions and an increase in legal conflicts of all sorts were, perhaps, an in-
evitable outgrowth of this situation.
The American equivalent of the Industrial Revolution came later in the century, was
achieved at less social cost, and left less class hostility. But mechanization and urbani-
zation, in America as in England, extracted a heavy toll from the lower economic class
and vastly increased the burdens upon the courts. Most hazardous of the new develop-
ments, and most productive of legal conflict, was the growth of rapid transportation sys-
tems. In themselves a respository of substantial capital investment, the trans1ortation
systems were also a sinw qua non of continued industrial and urban expansion. Malone
reports that in Louisiana, from 1854 to 18S8, 20 out of 21 contributory negligence cases artE
from accidents in which street railways and other new forms of transportation were in-
volved. "The courts could not escape observing that each controversy was invested with
implications that extended to the welfare of the entire local economy. This called for
caution lest the valuable new service be crippled. . . ." Malone, Comparaltc'. Vegli gnce
-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REv. 125, 139 (1945).
21. Malone, Tle Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 I.. L REv. 151,
156-8 (1946).
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sympathies in the single case before them.22 It was in this climate of opinion
that the liability of defendants became limited by the fault principle and that
courts came to be regarded as the refuge of those who could not protect them-
selves-not for those who could (according to the individualistic notions of
the times), but simply failed to do so. 23 It is easy to see how such an atmos-
phere would generate a sense of fairness and morality which would take ac-
count of an individual plaintiff's fault, as well as an individual defendant's.
Perhaps these feelings would have been satisfied by a rule that merely dimin-
ished plaintiff's damages because of his fault,2 4 though the stricter rule gave
the system even greater protection against burdens and greater opportunity
to control the jury so as to prevent what were believed to be its vagaries.2 5
However that may be, the combined pull of what was felt to be expediency
and of the scholastic urge to find a single proximate cause produced the all-
or-nothing rule.
Modern Justifications in Doctrine or Policy
Proximate cause. The contributory negligence rule is sometimes sought to
be justified as a corollary of principles of proximate cause.20  Plaintiff will
not, of course, be barred by contributory negligence unless his negligence was
a proximate cause of the damage sued for. But that has nothing to do with
the explanation of the defense presently being considered. The proposed ex-
22. Freedom of action, as understood by the representative philosophers of 19th cen-
tury liberalism, meant freedom from state intervention-judicial or legislative. And a
dominant theme throughout their writings is the close identification of material progress
and industrial expansion with the laws of nature and the hand of God. An excellent
summary of some of these philosophies is found in HoFSTAvTER, SOCIAL DARWixiSM 114
AmEimcAN THOUGHT 1860-1915 (1945) (especially cc. 2, 3, 4). Armed with a social
philosophy which relieved it of the care and responsibility for the less fortunate, flushed
with visions of an ever-expanding economy, and reassured by its philosophers of the
'righteousness' of their role in society, the entrepreneurial class, understandably enough,
developed a certain impatience with legal obstacles to the continued march of industrial
innovation.
23. Bohlen, supra note 5, at 254-5.
24. Note the decision in one of the fairly early contributory negligence cases, Raisin
v. Mitchell, 9 C. & P. 613 (C.P. 1839) (jury verdict for plaintiff but reduced damages,
since "there was fault on both sides," upheld by court). See the observations of Lindley,
L.J., in the Bernina, 12 P.D. 58, 88, 89 (C.A. 1887) ; and see discussion pages 731-5 infra.
25. The thesis of contributory negligence as an effective instrument of jury control
is developed by Malone in the two articles cited note 6 supra and passim. For examples
of criticism from the bench of jury vagaries, see especially Malone, The Formative Bra
of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151, 158-9 (1946).
26. "The theory of causation is the predominant [explanation of contributory negli-
gence] and it is submitted that, upon the whole, it is the most satisfactory." WiywmLD,
TORTs 414 (4th ed. 1948). See also Lord Atkin in Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Assoc. Col-
lieries, [1940] A.C. 152, 164-5; PoLLocx, TORTS 370 (14th ed., Landon, 1939); LAw
REvIsIoN COmMIT=EE, 8TH REPORT, CoNmIBuToRY NEGLIGENCE, C,. No. 6032 (1939).
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planation is this: plaintiff is precluded from recovery by his contributory
negligence because in the situations where the defense is applicable, his negli-
gence is the sole proximate cause of his injury. -7 If this explanation were ac-
cepted, it would account fully for both aspects of the rule in its present form.
The trouble with it is that it simply does not fit the facts. In the typical case
of contributory negligence both plaintiff and defendant would be liable to any
third person injured by the accident. Thus if two automobile drivers collide
at an intersection because neither is keeping a lookout, both are everywhere
held liable to a bystander hurt by the collision.28 This of course means that
the negligence of each is both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of the col-
lision (and ensuing damage) under any tests having general currency among
the courts today. Yet under the contributory negligence rule, neither driver
can recover from the other for his own injuries.
There are situations, to be sure, where plaintiff's negligence is the sole prox-
imate cause of his injury. But in such a case there is neither need nor room
for the doctrine of contributory negligence.20 Indeed the proposed explana-
tion is precisely the opposite of the case under the present rule. Contributory
negligence is vever properly invoked when plaintiff's negligence alone causes
the damage but only when the negligence of both the plaintiff and defendant
are contributing proximate causes of it.30
Of course it would be possible to construct a special definition of proximate
cause that would apply only to the connection between a plaintiff's negligence
and his own injury (and not to any other connection at all), and then to make
that definition fit current judicial applications of the contributory negligence
rule. Only in this way could the present explanation be validated.3 ' But this
would be the height of fatuity, and what resulted could hardly be dignified
27. "It [contributory negligence] rests on the view that though the defendant had in
fact been negligent, yet the plaintiff has by his own carelessness severed the causal con-
nection between the defendant's negligence and the accident which has occurred and that
the defendant's negligence accordingly is not the true proximate cause." Bowen, I.J.,
in Thomas v. Quartermaine, IS Q.B.D. 685, 697 (1887).
28. Lotesto v. Baker, 246 Ill. App. 425 (1927) ; McDonald v. Robinson, 207 Iowa
1293, 224 N.W. 82-0 (1929); Fraser v. Flanders, 248 Mass. 62, 142 N.E. 36 (1924):
accord, Meyer v. Cincinnati Street Ry., 157 Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E.2d 173 (1952) (passen-
ger may join allegedly negligent transit company and truck). See also additional cases
cited in Notes, 16 A.L.R. 465 (1922), 62 A.L.R. 1425 (1929).
29. 65 C.J.S. 708-9 (1950).
30. Ibid. See also cases cited in CGARK, CODE PLE.AD G 307 n.76 (2d ed. 1947), in
which the plea of contributory negligence was held to admit by necessary implication the
defendant's negligence and hence was inconsistent vth a denial thereof. Logically this
is so, but a preferred rule of pleading does not limit a pleader to consistency, and generally
both defenses are permitted. Id. at 303-7 and cases cited at n.76; see also FED. R. Civ.
P. S.
31. Bohlen, supra note 5, at 241 n.1; Lowndes, Contributory Vegliyence, 22 G wo. UJ.
674, 677-8 (1934). Both commentators, of course, reject such analysis as anything more
than a statement of result.
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by calling it an explanation. Some of the earlier restrictive notions about
cause, which have now been generally repudiated, have, however, persisted
as limitations on the defense of contributory negligence.3 2 This carryover
has brought confusion and caprice and some practical paradoxes, though in
the main its results have been defensible as half-way measures in mitigating
the harshness of the contributory negligence rule.38
Although notions of cause are inextricably bound up with the historical ex-
planation of contributory negligence, they will not serve as a justification of
the rule today.3 4
Assumption of risk. Contributory negligence has sometimes been thought
to be no more than an aspect of assumption of risk,85 so that plaintiff is barred
from recovery under the maxim "volenti non fit injuria." This explanation,
too, would warrant the rule in its present form, as a complete bar to plaintiff's
action. The two notions, however, do not cover the same ground and in many
situations do not even overlap, though they may. Assumption of risk involves
the negation of defendant's duty;316 contributory negligence is a defense to a
breach of such duty.3 7 Assumption of risk may involve perfectly reasonable
conduct on plaintiff's part ;8 contributory negligence never does. 0 Assump-
tion of risk typically involves the voluntary or deliberate incurring of known
peril ;40 contributory negligence frequently involves the inadvertent failure to
notice danger.4 ' Only confusion can come from failure to keep separate these
32. Thus the last clear chance doctrine has often been reasoned in terms of whether
or not plaintiff's contributory negligence was a proximate cause of his injury. Prentice,
J., in introducing last clear chance doctrine to Connecticut jurisprudence, described it as
"no independent principle operating by the side of, and possibly overstepping the bound4
of, other principles but merely a logical and inevitable corollary of the long accepted
doctrine of actionable negligence as affected by contributory negligence." Nehring v.
Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 115, 84 Atl. 301, 304 (1912). See Green, Contrib utory
Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3, 25 and n.50 (1927).
33. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
Compare, however, Prosser, Coinparative Negligence, 51 Micn. L. REv. 465, 473 (1953)
("its effect has been to freeze the transition rather than to speed it").
34. The attempt to justify contributory negligence in terms of proximate cause
generally has been treated sympathetically by English commentators, (see sources cited
supra notes 26-7) but critically by American commentators. See Bohlen, supra note 5,
at 234-42; Lowndes, supra note 31, at 675-8; Green, supra note 32, at 11-13. The report
of the Law Revision Committee, of which Lord Wright was chairman, was reviewed
critically in Paton, Contributory Negligence-Report of the Law Resision Committee, 14
Ausr. L.J. 379, 380-1 (1941).
35. "It is often said that the two defences ... [assumption of risk and contributory
aegligence], the two principles, are identical; and throughout the cases there is the great-
est confusion between them." Warren, T-olenti Non Fit Iniuria in Actions of Negligence,
8 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1895).
36. Bohlen, supra note 5, at 245.
37. Id. at 246.
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 247.
40. Id. at 246.
41. Id. at 246-7.
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two strands of legal doctrine.4 Yet they have this in common: both are mani-
festations of the philosophy of individualism which also underlay the concepts
of caveat emptor and freedom of contract between the employer and employee
of the last century.
The rule against contribution between (or among) wrongdoers and the
more or less companion notion that one who seeks the court's help must come
into court with clean hands, have also been suggested as reasons for the rule
of contributory negligence. 43 If this were the case, it would explain why con-
tributory negligence is a complete defense. Perhaps if the clean hands concept
is taken in a very loose and general sense as describing the notion that in a
system of liability based on fault it is fair to regard the plaintiff's negligence
as well as defendant's, it would not be altogether irrelevant here. But in any
stricter, more accurate, sense, this explanation (which rather indiscriminately
fuses clean hands and no-contribution) also fails to deserve acceptance for the
following reasons:
(1) There are situations in which a party will be barred as plaintiff by
his negligence but where the same party could have contribution or indemnity
with respect to a third person's claim under generally prevailing rules.44
42. For an analysis of doctrinal distinctions between them, see Bohlen, sapra note
5, at 243-52; Lowndes, supra note 31, at 679-81; Warren, su pra note 35, at 453-61; James,
Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE I.-. 141 (1952).
43. "Obviously it [contributory negligence] is a particular instance within the
wider doctrine that a court of law will not give redress to a plaintiff whose
case shows wrong in himself in the very matter whereof he complains. ...
And a familiar illustration is, that, if two persons join in a tort and one of
them pays the damage, he cannot enforce contribution against the other....
To reject the rule of contributory negligence, therefore, would not only re-
verse a line of decisions extending back to early times, but it would likewvise
take away from our legal structure a foundation pillar whereon a much
larger portion of it than mere negligence reposes."
BisHoP, Co A SEsNT n oN THE NoN-CoTRAcr LAw § 460 (1st ed. 1FS9) (footnotes
omitted). See also Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (l.V) (clean hands).
But cf. Leflar, The Declinhing Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 A=. L R. 1, 2-5
(1946).
44. Thus Dl, who has satisfied P's judgment against him, may have contribution from
D2, if Dl's negligence was "passive" or "secondary" in comparison with D2's "active"
or "primary" negligence. A typical statement is that contribution may be had if the
parties are not in "parn delicto." But D1 could not recover from D2 for injuries to him-
self or to his property arising from the same accident, except in a jurisdiction in which
the contributory negligence bar has been relaxed by a "degrees of negligence" or com-
parative negligence doctrine. Similarly, a negligent distributor of deficient materials has
a right to indemnity from the negligent supplier of the goods, although his own negli-
gence would preclude recovery for his own injuries, if any. See PnossEm, Toars § 109
(1941) ; Note, 45 HArv. L REv. 349 (1931). And cf. Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis.
591, 195 NAV. 855 (1923), in which D1 had a statutory right of contribution from D2
for injury to Dl's "pocketbook" (the judgment against him in favor of P) but no right
to damages for injuries to his automobile. Id. at 600, 195 N.W. at 859.
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(2) There are situations in which a party may not have contribution but
where his negligence will not be a bar to an action for his own injuries.U
(3) There are many situations in which a negligent plaintiff may recover
from a wrongdoer, except perhaps under the (now largely discredited) out-
law theory 4 -- which is indeed a fairly accurate reflection of some such notion
as an insistence on clean hands and shows its unacceptable harshness. Thus
a negligent plaintiff recovers in last clear chance cases ;47 in cases where the
injury came from a risk not connected with his negligence (or, as some would
say, not "proximately caused" by the negligence) ;48 in cases where injury
is wantonly or wilfully caused,40 and so on. In truth there never has been a
clean hands rule of general application in damage actions. 49a
(4) Any realistic appraisal of the no-contribution and contributory negli-
gence rules in modem context will show that they serve very different, even
opposed policies. Contributory negligence is a defendant's doctrine which cuts
down the chances of compensation for accident victims and checks prevailing
tendencies to distribute accident losses widely; its abolition would be a move
towards socialization of the loss. The no-contribution rule (though logically
indefensible) in practice tends to help plaintiffs to a recovery; its abolition
would thwart wide distribution of losses based on insurance principles."
Deterrence from careless conduct. Contributory negligence has often been
defended on the ground that it tends to deter individuals (prospective plain-
tiffs) from careless conduct.51 Before testing this suggestion we should note
two things: First, this would be a justification from policy or expediency
rather than doctrine. Surely the claim that a rule of law will promote accident
45. Thus if both P and D1 are injured by the negligence of D1 and D2, D1 may have
a right of recovery against D2 if D2 had the last opportunity of avoiding the accident,
but may have no right of either contribution or indemnity in the event of a judgment
against D1 in favor of P. See WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 84; Bohlen, supra note
5, at 243. But it has been increasingly suggested that the rule against contribution be-
tween tort-feasors be modified by the last clear chance doctrine. Nashua Iron & Steel Co.
v. Worcester & N.R.R., 62 N.H. 159 (1882); Comment, 34 YALE L.J. 427 (1925). And
see Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. or PA. L. Rv. 130,
151-4 (1932).
46. This theory would, for instance, hold the Sunday driver or hunter liable for in-
juries he caused because he was unlawfully profaning the Sabbath. E.g., White v. Levarn,
93 Vt 218, 108 At. 564 (1918). See James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Ac-
cident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95, 104 et seq. (1950).
47. RESTAT&MENT, TORTS §§ 479-80 (1934).
48. Id. § 468.
49. Id. § 482.
49a. See Sutton v. Wanwatosa, 29 Wis. 21 (1871).
50. This appraisal of the no-contribution rule is treated at greater length in an ex-
change of views in James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criti-
cism, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1156 (1941) ; Gregory, Contribution Antong Joint Torifeasors:
A Defense, id. at 1170; James, Replication, id. at 1178; Gregory, Rejoinder, td. at 1184.




prevention is entitled to serious consideration. The factual basis of the claim
deserves examination. Second, the reasoning from deterrence does not neces-
sarily lead to the all-or-nothing rule-diminution of damages or comparative
negligence would also serve as a deterrent.
The trouble with this attempted justification of contributory negligence is
that abolition of the present rule would in all probability promote accident
prevention more effectively than the present rule itself does."2 On a theoreti-
cal basis it will be seen that the defense of contributory negligence offers am-
nesty to a careless defendant every time it administers a deterrent lash to a
careless plaintiff, so that its effect as a deterrent is exactly offset by its in-
Nitation to be careless without penalty.53 But there are very practical con-
siderations which mean that pressures of this kind are more effectively brought
to bear against defendants as a class than plaintiffs as a class. In the first
place plaintiff himself (or his property) is a jeopardized participant in every
accident that injures him (or it), so that he is always subject to the strongest
motives to escape personal injury (or damage to his own property) quite
apart from any thought about civil liability. If the prospect of losing life or
limb does not make a plaintiff careful, little further inducement to care will
be added by speculations as to the outcome of a lawsuit. The same thing is
often true of defendants. Yet today those who bear the burden of accident
liability are increasingly absentee defendants-corporate and other employers
or insurance companies, whose lives and limbs are not at stake in the accident."
And if their property sometimes is at stake, in many situations there is not
even much danger to that: grade crossing accidents, motor vehicle-pedestrian
collisions, and cases involving dangerous condition of premises afford examples
of a pretty one-sided kind of risk. Defendants, then, will often lack a powerful
incentive to carefulness-self-preser-ation-that is virtually always present with
plaintiffs.r' It follows that the secondary incentive furnished by concern about
legal liability is more important for defendants as a class.
The foregoing argument would be valid even if prospective plaintiffs and
prospective defendants were in an equally strategic position to prevent acci-
52. The thesis that follows is developed in greater detail, with citations to relevant
empirical studies, in James, Accident Liabiliy Reconsidered: The Impact of Lability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948) ; and James & Dickinson, Accidenit Proneness a:d
Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1950).
53. Lowndes, supra note 31, at 681-3.
54. It is true that there is often an employee of defendant whose life is at stake in the
accident, so that the servant will have same incentive to care that plaintiff dues. And
the imposition of liability on such employee would add as little extra incentive in his case
as in plaintiff's. But for the master himself, this liability does add an incentive that would
not exist without it. And the master is in a more strategic position than the servant tj
prevent accidents. See notes 56, 57 infra.
55. James, Accident Liability Rcconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insura:ce, 57
YALE UJ. 549, 558 (1948) ; James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and lccident Laz,
63 HAgv. L. Rzv. 769, 780 (1950).
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dents. Recent studies into human behavior that produces accidents, however,
show that this is decidedly not the case. These studies make it abundantly
clear that large units, such as transportation companies, government, large
industrial concerns, and insurance companies, are in a strategic position to
reduce accidents and have done so very effectively-particularly since the
advent of absolute liability for industrial accidents.50 Conversely, these studies
emphasize the relatively insignificant part which the individual's conscious free
choice plays in causing or preventing accidents, 7 even where a court would
find him negligent. Since the large unit is the perennial defendant in accident
cases 58 and the individual the perennial plaintiff, contributory negligence puts
its pressure on the wrong place and relieves the pressure where it will do the
most good. It is a net incentive to carelessness, not to safety.
In passing it should be noted that these studies also show that stricter lia-
bility for accident need not puf a greater burden on business and industry.
It has often spurred the business man's ingenuity to find new devices and new
ways of doing things that have increased not only safety but productivity as
well.5 9
Impracticability of apportioning damages. It has often been suggested that
it is administratively impractical to apportion damages, particularly in cases
56. Insurance companies, for example, as depositories of large amounts of capital,
are in a position to finance elaborate programs in safety research, inspection, and educa-
tion. In certain fields of liability insurance, insurance companies have spent more for such
programs than in the satisfaction of claims. Particular progress has been achieved in such
heavily-insured activities as the operation of elevators, boilers, and industrial machinery
generally. Industrial casualties have dropped from an annual average of 36,000 during
the first world war to an annual average of 17,000 during the second war, despite the in-
terim expansion of the economy. For a more detailed examination of these studies, see
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALF L.J,
549, 559-63 (1948) ; James & Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Lazo of Torts,
15 LAw & CoNrEmp. PROB. 431, 440-2 (1950).
It is noteworthy that the very studies referred to were financed and carried on by
industrial enterprises interested in accident prevention. James & Dickinson, Accident
Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. Rzv. 769, 780 (1950).
57. These studies suggest that a significantly large proportion of accidents are caused
by a significantly small proportion of the population, designated as the "accident prone"
group. Among this group, accidents are not due to "carelessness" but to innate personal
characteristics operating without relevance to the individual's sense of responsibility and
independent of his conscious behavior. James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Ac-
cident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1950) passim.
58. It is true, of course, that in automobile cases the nominal defendant is often an
individual. But wheresuch an individual is worth suing he is almost invariably insured,
so that the direct pressure of legal liabilty is against the insurer. For an account of the
contribution by insurance companies to the cause of accident prevention, see James,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549
(1948).
59. James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REV.
769, 781 et seq. (1950).
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tried to a jury. 0 If this argument were accepted it would not justify a rule
of contributory negligence. Given the rule, however, such impracticability
would justify its taking an all-or-nothing form. The trouble with the argument
is that it does not reflect the fact. Theoretically, it would be no harder for
juries to make a rough but fair apportionment of faults than to perform many
feats that are daily required of them.(1 On the practical side, it may be pointed
out that under statutes in many Anglo-American jurisdictions, juries have for
years been apportioning damages according to fault, without any indication that
they are less able to perform this task than any other.62 To be sure in many of
these situations (e.g., underfthe Federal Employers' Liability Actca) the de-
fendant has not suffered injury that might be the subject of a counterclaim.
The complexity of apportionment is greatest-and the benefits of apportion-
ment are least-where the parties are cross-claiming against each other."
But even these complexities (which arise in a surprisingly small proportion of
the cases 65) are far from formidable and can be met by appropriate instruc-
tions and proper interrogatories. 6
60. Lowndes, supra note 31, at 68,3-5; BEACH, CoNrnruTroRY NFuoL.6 CE § 12 (3d
ed. 1899). The Beach treatise, written late in the last century, is obsolete as a definitive
statement of the law, but is an interesting example of the legal thinldng of the era. Beach
regarded the law of contributory negligence as the "only possible" doctrine which could
be applied, and without which the law would be an instrument "of oppression and in-
justice." Id. §§ 13, 35.
61. No harder, for example, than to determine the "proximate cause" of an accident,
particularly since the concept of "proximate cause" is frequently e.xplained to the jury in
terms difficult for laymen to comprehend.
62. One commentator has observed: "Experience in Ontario indicates that our pro-
posed system [based on comparative negligence] would function most ideally in trials bk-
fore a court without a jury." GREGoRY, LEGIsLATnv- Loss DISTRitLDUIO: 1N XEGLIGECZ
AcTIo-Ns 121 (1936). This does not necessarily suggest, however, that juries function
less ably in applying a comparative negligence doctrine than in applying the contributory
negligence doctrine. American juries have had considerable experience in comparative
negligence in cases arising under FELA, the Jones Act (seamen), and state statutes
modeled upon them; in cases calling for application of crude "degrees of negligence"
("gross," "slight," "ordinary") doctrines; in cases involving more refined comparative
negligence laws applying to specific situations, e.g., grade-crossing statutes; or in negli-
gence actions generally in a handful of states and in scattered applications of foreign
comparative negligence statutes. Canadian and English juries have had considerably more
experience in this task. And although there has been criticism of the jury system in
negligence actions generally, no criticism has been specifically directed to the operation
of the jury in comparative negligence situations. See, generally, id. App. A; Mole L
Wilson, szpra note 19; Turk, supra note 4; Whelan, Comparative Negligence, (193S]
Wis. L. REv. 465; and also Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CALiF. L REv. 91
(1932).
63. 35 STAT. 65 (1903), as amended, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51 (1946).
64. See Prosser, Comparati'e Negligence, 51 Mici. L RE'. 465, 503 et seq. (1953) ;
pages 733-5 infra.
65. Id. at 507.
66. Appropriate model instructions, based in part on fureign experience with similar
statutes, are given in GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 6?, c. 12; Mole & WNilson, supira note
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Appraisal of Contributory Negligence
The foregoing, it is submitted, shows that there is no justification-in either
policy or doctrine-for the rule of contributory negligence, except for the feel-
ing that if one man is to be held liable because of his fault, then the fault of
him who seeks to enforce that liability should also be considered. But this
notion does not require the all-or-nothing rule, which would exonerate a very
negligent defendant for even the slight fault of his victim. The logical cor-
ollary of the fault principle would be a rule of comparative or proportional
negligence, not the present rule. 67 And almost from the very beginning there
has been serious dissatisfaction with the Draconian rule 08 sired by a medieval
concept of cause, out of a heartless laissez-faire. Occasionally this dissatisfac-
tion took the form of a frank comparison of faults in one way or another. 0 So
strong is the pull of doctrinal orthodoxy, however, that courts have more often
assailed the rule indirectly by restricting its application or circumventing it
altogether, in ways we shall presently examine.70 Contributory negligence has
now for a long while been a distinctly disfavored defense. Thus, even while
the fault principle continues as a vital force in popular and judicial thinking
about accident liability, we may expect to see the contributory negligence rule
continually chiselled away.
Besides all that, the importance of fault itself is waning in our accident law.7'
There has been an oft-noted growing feeling that accident loss in modem life
should not be regarded as simply the individual concern of the participants in
the accident, but as part of the social cost of the enterprise that causes it.72
19, at 645-52. Interrogatories, use of which has expanded since publication of the above-
named materials, would still further simplify the mechanics of apportionment.
67. See GREGORY, op. cit. stpra note 62, at 72 et seq.
68. See GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 119 et seq. (1930).
69. Courts have attempted, for example, to compare fault by establishing "degrees
of negligence" correlated to "degrees of care." Perhaps the most advanced attempt at a
judicially-created doctrine of comparative negligence is what Turk has called the "gallant
attempt" of Illinois judges in the mid-nineteenth century. For its short history see Turk,
supra note 4, at 305-13; Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36 et seq. (1944) ;
Mole & Wilson, .rpra note 19, at 335; citations in 45 C.J. 1037 (1928). See, generally,
Elliott, supra note 62.
Green suggests that a more precise scheme of comparative negligence may have been
rejected because of the "violent reaction" to the "degrees of negligence" concept. "Nine-
teenth century morality was a severe thing. It demanded absolutes. Either a defendant
was responsible or he was not. Compromises were not to be endured." GREEN, JUDGE
AND JURY 122 (1930).
70. See discussion under text subheading: "THE RETREAT OF CONTnuToav NEGaL-
GENCE" infra.
71. See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951) ; Harris, Liability
Witlout Fault, 6 TULANE L. Ray. 337 (1932). For a less optimistic appraisal of this de-
velopment see Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV.
359 (1951).
72. Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAW & CONiI'.
PRoB. 445 (1950); Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's
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That would mean that the casualties of manufacturing or motoring, for in-
stance, should be distributed equitably among those who benefit from the enter-
prise. This feeling has been strengthened by the perfecting of techniques for
distributing such losses through insurance (even where the nominally liable
party is an individual), 73 and by an increasing realization that accident-pro-
ducing behavior on the part of individuals largely reflects human factors other
than personal moral shortcoming (ethical fault).'4 This newer point of view
has already given us liability without fault in workmen's compensation., The
chances are it will yield compensation schemes in other fields also." But
whether it does this or not, it has already worked itself into the voof and
warp of our accident law to produce what one writer has called "enterprise
liability" based on "negligence without fault."' 77 In an atmosphere where the
importance of fault itself is waning. contributory negligence will be bound to
meet with rapidly mounting disfavor. To date this disapproval has been largely
inarticulate in its reasoning, and also uneven in its incidence. But it has gone
so far in actual practice that contributory negligence is well on its way to be-
coming a dead letter,73 except as juries illicitly apply it to diminish a plain-
tiff's recovery.
Compensation, 12 LA. L. REv. 231 (1952) (Part I appears also in 9 NACCA L Rrw. 20
(1952)).
73. James, Accident I'ability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liaility Insurance. 57
YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Friedman, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Li,Ndlil.t
63 HARv. L. REv. 241 (1949) (referring to England).
74. James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARP. L. Rv
769 (1950).
75. Citations to some of the abundant literature in the field of wvorkmcn's co mpen-
sation statutes may be found in RIESENFELP & MAXWELL, MOMPN Si, LAL L ,Iq.,
136 n.69 (1950).
76. A motor vehicle accident compensation plan modeled upon workmen's c..mpon-
sation plans was proposed some 35 years ago. For excellent di-cussion, sce Csr~l- rr
To STUDY COXn'ENsATioN Fop AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REUO2"? TO THE COLU'!BIA UN.-
VEP.srI COTNCIL FOR REsE-ARCH IN SOCIAL SCIENCS (1932), generally lnmwn as the
"Columbia Report." Such a plan has been adopted in Saskmtchewan. See Grad, Recenzt
Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COt- L. REv. 300, 320 (19.50).
Also advocated is a similar plan for railay employees. See resolution adopted by House
of Delegates, American Bar Association, 74 A.B.A. REP. 103 (1949).
77. EIRENZwEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUr FAULT (1951) (a thoughtful historical and
analytic treatment of the subject, and an examination of future probabilities in legislative
and judicial law); see also Malone, The Brave Nc-w World-A Rcviw , of "'egligence
WVitiwut Failt," 25 So. CALn. L. REV. 14, 15 (1951).
78. "A decadent doctrine, which will ultimately disappear from the law," Smith,
Sequel to Workme's Compensation Acts, 27 ALRv. L REV. 235, 243 (1913) ; "it has been
looked upon with increasing disfavor by the courts," Prossm, To.rs 394 (1941); "[flor
many years, juries have been deciding cases just as though there was no such rule of
law," MmANr, A JUDGE T.KEs THE STAvN 31 (1933); "ithis tall timber in the legal
jungle has been whittled down to toothpick size by the sympathetic sabotage of juries...
by the emotional antagonism of judges ... by the popular prejudices of legislators... ;
little remains to be written about contributory negligence save its obituary." Lovwndes,
supra note 31, at 674.
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THE RETREAT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The rest of this Article will explore the ways in which contributory negli-
gence is being undermined. These may be conveniently treated under three
heads:
The first of these is easy to state. There are ever growing limitations on
the kinds of actions in which the defense will be permitted.
The second needs a word of explanation. Under the formal structure of
tort law the concept of negligence is to be found on both sides of the scale in
these cases. This holds out a specious appearance of symmetry that has be-
guiled many a commentator into supposing that the concept has or should have
pretty much the same connotation on either side.70 A moment's reflections,
however, will show that this would be most surprising if it were true. The
shift in outlook towards accident liability that has taken place over the last
century has led to an ever-increasing expansion of the concept of negligence
where that will lead to compensating an accident victim for his loss. It would
be strange indeed if there had been a concomitant expansion of the negligence
which would cut that compensation off. Every practical man knows this has
not been the case. What has emerged has been a double standard which in all
candor ought to be recognized 8 0
In addition to the two lines of attack on contributory negligence just de-
scribed, there have been some miscellaneous procedural and substantive amel-
iorating doctrines. This century, for instance, has seen an almost complete
abandomnent of the older rule in some states which put on plaintiff the bur-
den of pleading and proving his freedom from contributory negligence. Over
a somewhat longer period the last clear chance doctrine has grown to make
serious inroads on the defense. 8 ' And there have been a few statutory ventures
in comparative negligence.
Limitations on the Applicability of Contributory Negligence
The frequently made statement that, in general, contributory negligence is
a defense only to actions grounded on negligence, is no more than a generali-
79. "[B]ut negligence is negligence, no matter who commits it, and what would be
negligence if committed by a defendant would likewise be negligence if committed by a
plaintiff." Layton, C.J., in Willis v. Schlagenhauf, 38 Del. (8 Harr.) 96, 102, 188 Atl.
700, 702 (1936). See also PRossER, ToRTs 395 (1941) ; RsrsrTa~mr, ToRTs § 289 (1934).
One conceptual difference generally recognized is that the defendant's conduct should
be judged in terms of the foreseeability of unreasonable risk to others, while the plaintiff's
conduct should be judged in terms of foreseeability of unreasonable risk for himself.
Often there will be no difference in result, but conceivably there may be conduct threaten-
ing harm only to the actor, or harm only to others and not to the actor. See PRossan,
ToRTs 394-5 (1941).
80. See James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 -AM. L. RLV.
769, 786 et seq. (1950).
81. The last clear chance doctrine will not be treated in this Article. See James,
Last Clear Chance: A Transitioial Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
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zation of what the courts do. It is not an explanation of why they do it. The
only claim such a statement could make to being a reason for the result would
have to rest on the balanced symmetry of a rule which deals negligence out
so even-handedly to plaintiffs and defendants. But such reasoning, aside from
the aesthetic appeal of the form of words in which it is cast, is more appro-
priate to the gaming table than the bench. Thus it remains to consider on the
merits the applicability of the defense to various grounds of action. And it
will be found that the refusal to apply it springs from different reasoning and
different policies in different types of situations. There is probably one com-
mon thread that runs through them all-the strong and growing dissatisfac-
tion on all hands with the contributory negligence rule in its present form.
Intentional wrongs. It is often said that contributory negligence is no de-
fense to an action based on intentional wrongdoing.82 It would be more ac-
curate to say that "if the consequences of which the plaintiff complains were
intended by the defendant, contributory negligence is out of the case." s3 On
this proposition all agree.8 4 All agree, too, that the rule stems from a com-
parison of faults. Intentional wrongdoing is so much graver a wrong than
negligence both in its social consequences and in the amount of resentment it
arouses that the felt need both to deter and to punish it outweighs any social
benefits that are thought to accrue from the rule of contributory negligence.t -3
82. See, e.g.. Moore v. El Paso Chamber of Commerce, 220 SAV.2d 327, 329 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949).
83. ,VWu. ms, op. cit. supra note 16, at 198. Compare the similar statement in R.-
STATEMENT, ToRTs § 481 (1934).
84. Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 (18-0); Ruter v. Foy, 4b Itwa 132 (1877);
Reynolds v. Guthrie, 145 Kan. 315, 65 P.2d 272 (1937); Hawk v. Slusher, 55 Ore. 1,
104 Pac. 883 (1909); PRossER, TORTS 402 (1941); HARPER, LAw ..r To.rs 3234 (1933):
Lovmdes, supra note 31, at 686.
The rule that contributory negligence will not bar recovery for damages caused by
intentional harm has not been uniformly applied to claims based rn intentiunal fraud,
misrepresentation, or deceit. Here the force of "caveat emptor" has not been entirely ex-
hausted, despite its rejection by the commentators. See 5 Wnmuso:;, Co:EAcrs § 1515-
16B (Williston & Thompson ed. 1936), and cases cited therein and in its 1952 Cumulative
Supplement. See also PRossm, TonRs 747-51 (1941); Bauer, Contributory Negligence
as a Defense to an Action for Fraud, IS Noon DAmE Lm,. 331 (1943); Harpzr &
McNeily, A Synthesis of the Law of Mlisreprescntation, 22 Mxu.n. L Rnv. 939, 957-9
(1938).
Even under the general rule which rejects contributory negligence as a defense in
these actions, some of the potency of contributory negligence may lurk in such concepts
as materiality, right to rely on the statement, and the notion that limitation pericds run
from the time when the fraud should have been discovered. Such problems are collateral
to the present subject matter. See in general SHuLAN & JAmES, CASES AN;D IATEALS
oN Tours c. 6 (2d ed. 1952), and citations there collected.
85. See PRossEn, ToRTs 402 (1941); Cooley, Problems in Contributory Negligence,
89 U. oF PA. L. Rv.a 335, 348 (1941) ; Lowndes, supra note 31, at S6-. The -came value3
are reflected in other rules governing the intentionally harmful tortfeasvr. See Bauer,
The Degree of Moral Fault as Affccting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. op PA. L R w. 5c6
(1933) (broader scope of causation) ; Bauer, The Degree of Defendant's Fault as Afflect-
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The prohibition against comparison of negligence, which has had such a
strong-almost compulsive-hold on the Anglo-American judicial mind, is
propitiated by pointing to the clear difference in kind between the two wrongs
involved ;8c it is only negligences that must not be compared, faults on a dif-
ferent plane may be.
It is only to the unavoidable or intended consequences of defendant's
conduct that the above rule clearly applies. If a man is threatened with a
battery, his failure to retreat (though unreasonable) will not prevent his
recovery for the battery, 7 but if he heedlessly fails to care for his wounds
so that gangrene sets in and he loses a limb, he cannot recover for that aggra-
vation of his original injury.8 8 The "duty"8 to mitigate damages, that is, has
relevance to the avoidable and unintended consequences of intentional acts,
though the "duty" is often relaxed and modified when it is invoked by a wil-
ful wrongdoerY0
Although contributory negligence is not a defense to recovery for un-
avoidable consequences of intentionally harmful torts, consent may be.0 1 Con-
ing the Administration of the Law of Excessive Compensatory Damages, 82 U. or PA.
L. Ry. 583 (1934) ; Morris, Punitive Damages in; Tort Cases, 44 HAv. L. Rpm. 1173
(1931).
86. "The doctrine of contributory negligence has no application in an action for as-
sault and battery. . . . An assault and battery is not negligence. The former is inten-
tional; the latter is unintentional." Ruter v. Foy, 46 Iowa 132, 133 (1877).
87. McComiciC, LAW OF DAMAGES 137 (1935). The line may sometimes be a thin
one between "failure to retreat," which does not affect recovery, and "provocation," which
may go towards reducing damages. See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 921 (193'l).
88. Id. § 918(a), ill. 1.
89. Generally called the "duty" to mitigate damages, it is not strictly a "duty" in the
Hohfeldian sense, since a failure to mitigate gives rise to no right of action in another.
The tort victim's "duty" is only to himself. See McCo-LAicx, LAW oF DAMAGES 128
(1935), and sources cited therein.
90. According to the Restatement, if the tort is one of negligence, P may not recover
damages "for such harm as he could have avoided by the use of due care after the com-
mission of the tort"' RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 918(1) (1934). If the tort is intentionally
harmful (or reckless) P may not recover damages for consequences following the tort
if, knowing of the danger, he "intentionally or heedlessly failed" to avoid them. Id. § 918
(2). And see id. § 918(a), ill. 6.
This distinction has been criticized as too rigid. Bauer, The Administration of the
Rule of Avoidable Conseqtences as Affected by the Degree of Blameworthiness of the
Defendant, 27 MINN. L. REV. 483 (1943) ("The degree of defendant's blameworthiness
often modifies the operation of the general rule of avoidable consequences; but this modi-
fication, it is submitted, is nearly always one resulting from tendency rather than from
the application of any rigid rule." Id. at 499). See also Note, 36 Ky. L.J. 134 (1937).
A good many of the cases cited in these articles involve nuisances and the problems
treated on pages 715-23 infra.
91. See Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24
COL. L. REv. 819 (1924); HARPER, LAW OF TORTS c. 3 (1933); PROSSa, TORTS 117




sent may render lawful that which would otherwise be unlawful (as in the case
of a surgical operation), or it may not (as in the case of a prizefight or an
abortion). In the former case it is a defense;02 in the latter cases the rulings
diverge.
s3
It is an interesting but not very important question whether contributory
intent will bar an action for intended consequences.0
4
The above discussion is confined to cases where defendant intended the harm
or regarded it as inevitable. There are many situations in which defendant
intended to do the very act or create the very condition that caused the injury,
but intended no harm thereby. If the act or condition was unreasonably dan-
gerous and harm results, defendant is liable to the victim, but under current
notions his liability is premised on negligence,05 and contributory negligence
is a defense. In such a case it is not the intent which is controlling but the
degree of danger that should be anticipated from the intended act or condition.
Of course, the manifest danger may be so great that defendant's conduct will
amount to wantonness.
96
TV ilfid, wanton, or reckless nisconduct. Under the prevailing American
rule contributory negligence is no defense to an action for an injury caused by
92. Pouocx, ToRTs 124 (14th ed., Landon, 1939).
93. Consent a defense to recovery (prizefight): Lyldns v. Hamrick, 144 Iy. 80, 137
SV. 852 (1911); Hart v. Geysel, 159 Wash. 632, 294 Pac. 570 (1930); REST%TE_!E:.T.
Toars § 60, ill. 1 (1934).
Consent not a defense to recovery (prizefight) : Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal2d 654, 204
P2d 1 (1949) ; Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okla. 273, 292 Pac.. 356 (1930) ; Barhold v. Wright,
45 Ohio St. 177, 12 N.E. 185 (187). Conpare Hudson v. Craft, supra, with the decision
which it reversed, Hudson v. Craft, 195 P.2d 857 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1948).
Consent a defense to recovery (abortion) : Miller %. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2.
217 (1949) ; Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S.W. 831 (1896) ; Szadwicz v. Can-
tor, 257 Mass. 518, 154 N.E. 251 (1926); Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 2,3, 31 P2d 273
(1934).
Consent not a defense to recovery (abortion) : Martin v. Hardesty, 91 Ind. App. 239,
163 N.E. 610 (1928) ; M illiken v. Heddesheimer, 110 Ohio St. 381, 144 X.E. 264 (1924);
Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 68 N.W. 869 (196).
94. See WnuJA s, op. cit. supra note 16, at 199-200. See also discussion in Galves-
ton H. & S.A. Ry. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365, 48 SAV. 563 (1893).
There is no civil liability for untrue statements in connection with the sale of scuri-
ties under the Securities Act of 1933 if the purchaser kmew the statements to be untrue.
48 STAT. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78r(a) (1946).
Contributory intent may sometimes be assimilated to consent.
95. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) ; Prosser, Contributor, .Vgclncnce as a
Defenwe to Violation of Statute, 32 Mm.. L. REv. 107, 112 (1948) ; James, Cldef Justice
Maltbie & the Law of Negligence, 24 CoxN. B.J. 61, 74-5 (1950). Compare text pages
716, 721-2 infra.
96. As in Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, Inc., 64 Ariz. 101, 166 P.2d
816 (1946) (driver of defendant's truck passed another truck on blind curve appraching
crest of hill, thereby blocking whole lane for oncoming traffic). See alsJ REST. -Vm!';T,
ToRTs § 500 (1934).
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such misconduct,97 though this seems to be doubtful in England. 8 Here again
(as in the case of intended consequences) the rule may be explained by the
strong natural feeling that faults should be compared, that a serious wrongdoer
should not escape liability because of the trivial misstep of his victim. 0 Here
again courts justify comparison of faults by pointing out that wilful or wanton
misconduct is different from negligence in kind, not merely in degree.1 10 And
here again the courts still apply the all-or-nothing rule; they compare plain-
tiff's fault with defendant's only to see whether it will be a defense at all, not
for the purpose of diminishing damages.101
While contributory negligence does not bar an action for injury wantonly
inflicted, plaintiff's conduct will bar such an action if it is itself a wanton or
wilful exposure of his own person or property to the risk-wantonness will
bar an action for wanton misconduct.10 2 Thus where a pedestrian who was
signalling a trolley car to stop kept standing in the middle of the track while
the car approached at unabated speed and finally hit him, his wanton self-ex-
posure to peril barred his action for the motorman's wantonness.103 This
notion has been frequently invoked in actions under automobile guest statutes
where plaintiff must prove wantonness and will not be barred by ordinary
97. Note, Coinimon Law Exceptios to the Defense of Contributory Negligence, 32
CoL L. REv. 493, 500-1 (1932) ; HA'Ra, LAW Or TonTs 324-5 (1934) ; PROSSER, TORTS
402 (1941); RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 482(1) (1934) ("reckless disregard," which is de-
fined in id. § 500). Extensive collections of cases in support of the proposition are in
45 C.J. 981 n.50 (1928) ; 65 C.J.S. 751 n.9 (1950) ; 38 Am. Jur. 854 n.8 (1941) ; and in
the West Digest system under Key No. Negligence 100.
The doctrine has been rejected in one jurisdiction as involving the same administrative
difficulties as would a rule of comparative negligence. Wittstruck v. Lee, 62 S.D. 290,
252 N.W. 874 (1934). The legislature subsequently enacted a comparative negligence
statute, S.D. Laws 1941, c. 160, but judicial interpretation of it has been very strict. See
Freise v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d 438 (1943); Roberts v. Brown, 72 S.D.
480, 36 N.W.2d 665 (1949).
98. Wu.LIms, op. cit. mspra note 16, at 201-2 ("the rule . . . seems to receive no
support from English authorities"). No discussion of the point has been found in other
English sources.
99. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (1908); Lowndes,
supra note 31, at 686-8; PROSSER, TORTS 402 (1941).
100. "The whole doctrine that contributory negligence is no defense where the injury
is the result of recklessness and wantonness is based upon the theory of a difference in
kind." Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 79 Kan. 183, 189, 98 Pac. 804, 807 (1908).
101. See, e.g., Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 202, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943), the
first definitive acceptance of the rule in that jurisdiction, in which the court rejects any
suggestion that comparative negligence is involved.
102. E.g., Elliott v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 356 Pa. 643, 53 A.2d 81 (1947).
103. Elliott v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 643, 53 A.2d 81 (1947), reversing
160 Pa. Super. 291, 50 A.2d 537 (1947), 51 Dxcx. L. REv. 187, 21 Tm P. L.Q. 189, 96




contributory negligence.' 04 If plaintiff knows that his driver host is drunk,
for instance, 10 or that he has a physical handicap which makes it dangerous
for him to drive,100 the guest's voluntary self-exposure to such a risk may be
so unreasonable as to bar him under the present principle even if the court
sees in defendant's conduct a wanton breach of a duty to use care towards
plaintiff.'07 The same thing would be true if the host had engaged in persistent
and obvious recklessness and the guest had acquiesced in it without remon-
strance, or had failed to abandon the relationship. 08
The rule which excludes contributory negligence where defendant's conduct
is wanton has been subjected to criticism. 10 Williams has called it "no more
than an improvisation desigued to limit the operation of the common-law rule
denying recovery in cases of contributory negligence.""' 0 An American court
104. See, generally, Rice. The Automobile Guest and the Rationale of A rssumption
of Risk, 27 'Mrmz. L. REv. 323, 492 (1943) ; White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver
to a Non-Paying Passenger. 20 VA. L. Rm-. 326 (1934) ; 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOP.DIA Or
Auromo11-E LAW AND PRActicE pt. I, 356-67 (rev. ed. 1946). A similar result is ob-
tained in a few jurisdictions without guest statutes by analogy tu the law of bailments.
Id. pt. I, at 352-6.
105. Gill v. Arthur, 69 Ohio App. 386, 43 N.E.2d S94 (1941) ; Schubring v. Weggen,
234 Wis. 517, 291 N.W. 788 (1940) (non-statutory) ; Garrity v. 'Mangan, 232 Iowa 1123,
6 N.W.2d 292 (1942) ; Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So.2d 646 (1947) ; Schneider
v. Brecht, 6 Cal App.2d 379, 44 P.2d 662 (1935) ; Price v. Schroeder, 35 Cal. App2d
700, 96 P.2d 949 (1939). See additional cases in Note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1951).
106. See Doggett v. Lacey, 121 Cal. App. 395, 9 P.2d 257 (1932) (one-armed driver);
Maybee v. Maybee, 79 Utah 585, 11 P.2d 973 (1932) (near-sighted driver); 4 BL~su-
=TED. op. cit. supra note 104, pt. I at 715-6.
107. In such a case assumption of risk would also bar the action. James, Assumption
of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 150-1 (1952). The distinction between denying recovery be-
cause of assumption of risk and denying it because of P's wilful and wanton misconduct
under the guest statutes is elaborated in Gill v. Arthur, 69 Ohio App. 3M6, 395, 43 N.E24
894, 899 (1941). Of the results reached in cases cited in note 105 supra, the first four
were explained by the courts in terms of assumption of risk, the latter two in what the
Gill court calls the "equal culpability rule." Compare cases cited in Note, 15 A.LR2d
1165, 1177 §8 (1951), with those cited in id. at 1180 §9.
108. See Young v. Nunn, Bush & Weldon Shoe Co., 212 "Wis. 403, 249 N.11. 273
(1933) ; cases cited in Note, 154 A.L.R. 924 (1945) ; 4 BLASHFML, op. cit. Mpra note
104, pt. I at 714-18.
109. See notes 110-12 infra and accompanying text. For different criticism, see the ex-
cellent analysis in Burrell, A New Approach to the Problem of Wilful and Wanton Mis-
conduct, [1949] Ixs. L.J. 716 (particularly at pp. 723-6).
"The recognition of wilful and wanton misconduct stems from an inarticulate
perception of a psychiatric truth. Our method of dealing with it is not only
unscientific, but, more important, our purpose is primitive. Compensation for
the injured person should be unrelated to the treatment of the malfeasor, and
this treatment should be curative, not vindictive." Id. at 726.
110. Wns .As, op. cit. supra note 16, at 202. See also Grnoay, Luzist.Tn Loss
Dis=BunTnoN u NEGLIGE EN Acrxoxs 52 (1936) ("as objectionable as... contributory
negligence... [ ; it] substitute[s] one harsh and arbitrary doctrine for another") ; Mfalone,
Comparative Negligance-Lottisiano's Forgotten Heritage, 6 L.. L. REv. 125, 141 (1941)
("another doubtful device to avoid... contributory negligence").
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has found that it involves the same administrative difficulties as would a rule
of comparative negligence, and so has repudiated it.111 Commentators have
complained that the rule calls for a line that is hard to draw in practice, and
that the words employed in the test have not been used consistently. 11 In
spite of all this the rule provides a much needed escape along fairly rational
lines from an over-harsh doctrine.113 It is a step in the direction of compara-
tive negligence, though a crude one.
Extra-hazardous activities. People do, of course, engage in some perfectly
lawful activities at peril of liability for the damages they may cause.114 Where
that is so, contributory negligence is generally not a defense. Such a result
does not stem from a comparison of faults, for defendant has (often) been
innocent and plaintiff negligent so that the fault principle would find contri-
butory negligence to be a defense here more readily than in cases where de-
fendant's conduct was blameworthy.110  Rather there is here the placing of
liability on a basis other than fault. Often this is the extra-hazardous nature
of defendant's lawful and desirable activity, coupled with the fact that its prof-
its sometimes tend to put defendant in a better position to spread the loss from
the enterprise's casualties than are its victims.1 1 Society has, in effect, per-
mitted defendant's activity on condition that he compensate those injured by
its peculiar hazards 17 and has thereby transferred some of the duty to protect
111. Wittstruck v. Lee, 62 S.D. 290, 252 N.W. 874 (1934). The subsequently enacted
Comparative Negligence Statute, S.D. Laws 1941, c. 160, has been strictly interpreted
by the judiciary. See note 97 supra.
112. Turk, mtpra note 4, at 203-4 ("unworkable"); Note, Those Weasel Words-
"Wilful and Wanton," 92 U. OF PA. L. REv. 431 (1944) ("chameleon-like characteristics")
Cooley, Problems in Contributory Negligence, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 335, 348-50 (1941).
113. GaEN, JUDGE AND JURY 121 n.42 (1930).
114. See, e.g., HARPER, LAw OF Toas c. 10 (1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS c. 10 (1941)
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 507, 519 (1934); Gregory, Trespass to Nuisance to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951) ; Foster & Keeton, Liability Without Fault in Okla-
honma, 3 OxLA. L. REV. 1, 172 (1950) ; Note, 61 HARv. L. REV. 515 (1948). Some recent
cases are Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948); Whitman Hotel Corp.
v. Elliott & Watrous E. Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).
115. This statement, to be sure, ignores the difficulty of calling plaintiff's negligence
"contributory" when there is no negligence of defendant to which it can contribute. But
the difficulty is no more than a play on words. On the verbal level it is readily avoided by
noting that plaintiff's negligence may be called "contributory" if it contributes to his in-
jury. And if it does, then -plaintiff's fault is significant for the purpose of any valid policy
that may underlie the concept of contributory negligence. See Lowndes, Contributory
Negligence, 22 GaO. L.J. 674, 689 et seq. (1934).
116. There are situations where the loss may be more efficiently distributed by prop-
erty insurance (held by plaintiffs) than through the more cumbersome device of tort lia-
bilities even where that is covered by liability insurance. This consideration would favor
doctrines that withhold or restrict liability in such a case. See Morris, Hazardous Enter-
prises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952) ; James, Scope of Duly in
Negligence Cases, 47 N.U.L. Ray. 778 (1953).
117. See authorities cited note 114 supra. Cf. James, Nature of Negligence, 4 UTAI
L. Ra.- (1953). Compare the excellent statement made nearly one hundred years ago
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potential victims from the victims themselves to the entrepreneur. In such a
context ordinary questions of negligence on either side of the scale become
irrelevant."5 Human failings like inadvertence are simply part of the setting
that makes a toll of the enterprise inevitable. The same philosophy underliei
workmen's compensation acts.
Liability for the keeping-or at least for the escape--of dangerous animals
is also strict,1 9 and here also ordinary contributory negligence is not a de-
fense. 20 In these cases the defendant's activity is less often profitable, but it
is dangerous and perhaps of more marginal social utility than, for example,
blasting.' 12
Not all cases of liability at peril involve extra-hazardous activity. Some--
such as liability for cattle trespass-are said to be vestiial traces of an earlier
"amoral" period in our law, and it has been suggested that contributory negli-
by Baron Bramwell: "The public consists of all the individuals f it, and a thing i,
only for the public benefit when it is productive of good to those individuals on the
balance of loss and gain to all. So that if all the loss and all the gain were brme
and received by one individual, he on the whole would be a gainer. But whenever
this is the case-whenever a thing is for the public benefit, prorerly understQ-d-the
loss to the individuals of the public who lose will bear comrensati, n ",ut of the gains of
those who gain. It is for the public benefit there should be railways, but it would n,,t h
unless the gain of having the railway was sufficient to compensate the loss by the ue of
the land required for its site; and accordingly, no one thinks it would be right to ta!Ze al
individual's land without compensation to make a railh-ay. It is for the public benefit that
trains should run, but not unless they pay their e.penses. If one of these e:penses is the
burning down of a wood of such value that the railvay owners would not run the train
and burn down the wood if it were their own, neither is it for the public benefit theC
should if the wood is not their own. If, though the wood were their ownv, they still would
find it compensated them to run trains at the cost of burning the wiid, then they ol-
viously ought to compensate the owner of such wood, not being themselves, if they bum
it down in making their gains." Baniford v. Turnley, 3 Best & S. cb, S4, X5, 122 Erg.
Rep. 25, 33 (Em 1862).
118. See Lowndes, Contribzitory, Negligence, 22 GEo. UJ. 674, 6S9 c scq. (10341
HAum, LAw oF ToRTs § 164 (1933) ; R5TAT .imENT, Tonrs § 525 (1934).
119. RErSTATENT, TORTs § 507 (1934). Compare McNeely, A Footnote on Danger-
ous Animals, 37 Micir. L. REv. 1181 (1939).
120. Wojewoda v. Rybarczyk, 264 Mich. 641, 225 N.W. 555 (1929) (carelessly step-
ping on dog) ; Muller v. McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195 (1878) (forgetting presence of vicious
watchdog) ; Tidal Oil Co. v. Forcum, 1S9 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941) (crawling under
building to get dog not known by decedent to be vicious) ; Moore v. McKay, 55 S.V24
865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (postman's ringing doorbell in spite of sign warning him this
would arouse bad dog); Note, 69 A.L.R. 500, 513 (1930).
121. See McNeely, A Footnote on Dangerous Animals, 37 MxcH. L REv. 1181, 1193,
1199 (1939) (discussion of utility in connection with possible liability on a negligence
basis). There is here a suggestion that public zoos should be treated tenderly, hcause
they are educational and not for profit. See also Lowndes, op. cit. supra note 118, at 693.
But surely they are not less dangerous for this reason, and the profit (though non-lp.cu-
niary) is to the public, which is exactly the body that would foot the bill fur the casualties
that are a cost of this profit.
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gence should be a defense here.122 But why should it be? The suggestion pre-
supposes the superiority of the fault principle over that of strict liability (a
superiority which is far from clear 123) and ignores the fact that contributory
negligence is the weakest spot in the fault principle even if that principle be
thought desirable on the whole. At any rate the question is largely academic,
for in this field most of the cases turn on the question whether plaintiff had the
duty to fence cattle out, or defendant to fence them in, rather than on contri-
butory negligence as we are using the term in the present discussion.124
Even where liability is strict, however, plaintiff may be barred if he con-
sents to or assumes the risk.125 Thus one who engages to take care of defen-
dant's dangerous animals or takes a job where he knows there is to be blast-
ing could scarcely complain (under tort principles) of injuries caused by the
animals or the blasting without defendant's negligence. Moreover if plaintiff
actually knows of the risk and appreciates it, yet unreasonably encounters it,
he will probably be barred even where the relationship between the parties is
not one of voluntary association which either one is free to take or leave as
he will.126 Such conduct is often called "assumption of risk,"'2 7 but it does
122. Lowndes, op. cit. mipra note 118, at 696.
123. See, e.g., Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS, 433, 437 et seq. (1934); James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 H~Av. L. REv. 769, 777 et seq. (1950).
124. Holgate v. Bleazard, [1917] 1 K.B. 443, illustrates this and holds that even if
plaintiff has covenanted with his own landlord to keep proper fences, his failure to do so
is no defense to his action against a neighbor for trespass by the latter's cattle. Wheeler
v. Woods, 205 Iowa 1240, 219 N.W. 407 (1928), approved an instruction denying recovery
for cattle trespass if the animal escaped through plaintiff's portion of a partition fence,
See Note, 34 Iowa L. REv. 318 (1949). For interesting background of the fence wars on
our great plains, see WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS (1931).
After noting the obligation to fence, Williams makes this interesting suggestion:
"Nevertheless if a landowner actually sees his neighbors' cows approaching an open gate
and making for his own cabbages, it is probable that the courts would throw upon him the
onus of making reasonable efforts to prevent entry by the cows." WILLAMs, JOINT ToRTrs
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 286 (1951).
125. HARPER, LAw OF ToRTs 348, 349 (1933). The case of Eastern & S.A. Tel. Co. v.
Cape Town Tramways Co., [1902] A.C. 381 (P.C.), cited by Harper, suggests that plain-
tiff by his own conduct may take himself outside the scope of the duty owed under the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Plaintiff in Cape Town Tram-
ways maintained a telegraph cable whose operation was susceptible to disruption "by even
minute currents of electricity." [1902] A.C. at 393. The court held that defendant's duty
to prevent the escape of electricity from its tramway system did not extend to the pro-
tection of instrumentalities so sensitive. Cf. Lake S. & M.S.R.R. v. Chicago, L.S. & S.B.
R.R., 48 Ind. App. 584, 92 N.E. 989, 95 N.E. 596 (1910); Prosser, Nuisance Without
Fault, 20 Tnx. L. Rxv. 399, 405 (1942).
126. The cases cited in note 120 supra all state this as to animal cases. See also 3
C.J.S. 1255 (1936) ; Note, 69 A.L.R. 500, 513 (1930) ; REsTATEMNT, ToRTs § 515 (1934).
Cases of injury by explosives where a similar rule is applied are Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conu,
51, 118 AUt. 467 (1922) ; Wells v. Knight, 32 R.I. 432, 80 Atl. 16 (1911). Cf. RrSTATE.
MENT, TORTS § 525 (1934).
127. See, e.g., PROSSER, TORTS 463 (1941).
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not constitute assumption of risk in the primary sense as do the illustrations
given above.'2 It is a case where plaintiff is barred because his conduct is
unreasonable and involves fault of a graver kind than mere inadvertence or
carelessness. "Assumption of risk" here means wilful and unreasonable self-
exposure to risk.'2O
The defense just described simply represents the limit to which the law goes
in transferring the duty of their own protection from the victims to the creator
of extra-hazardous enterprise. It shows that there is felt to be room for some
individualism even in a rule concerned primarily with the distribution of acci-
dent losses according to insurance principles. Perhaps an analogy may be
found in provisions excluding a work-man from compensation where his own
misconduct has been serious and wilful.' 30
Nudsance. The question whether contributory negligence is a defense to
nuisance is complicated by the breadth and confusion that mark the concept of
nuisance. In one of its aspects, this branch of the law seeks to adjust com-
peting uses of land among different landowners and to determine the limits
within which a defendant may use his land in a way that will result in some
kind of injury to the beneficial use and enjoyment of other landY"3 ' In this
context contributory negligence does not play much of a part.'2- To be sure
defendant's conduct may involve negligence in the ordinary sense,las but it
need not; and absence of negligence is no defense if the result of defendant's
use of his land involves an unreasonable interference with plaintiff's use of
his own, under the criteria of nuisance.134
The inapplicability of contributory negligence here seems sound on prin-
ciple. The case is often one where defendant is deliberately engaging in con-
duct or maintaining a condition which more or less inevitably invades plain-
tiff's interests to an extent which the law forbids.135 The situation therefore
128. See James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
129. Cf. Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 118 At. 467 (192) ("reckless and unnecesmry
exposure to risk of injury").
130. See, e.g., Hosovrz, WoR ;'s CoiPENsAr;o 313 (1944).
131. See, e.g., PROSSER, ToRrs § 73 (1941) (at page 585 this author aptly describes
the law of private nuisance as a "process of judicial zoning").
132. See pages 716-18 infra and Notes, 19 MAx.l. L. REv. 249 (1935, 57 A.L.R. 7
(1928).
133. An example is afforded by the leaving of the carcass of an animal hilled by a
train to rot on the right of way, as in 'Missouri K. & T.RR. v. Burt, 8 Tex. Civ. App.
406, 27 S.W. 943 (1894). See also WooD, LAw OF Nuisa.A;cs § 143 (3d ed. 1893).
134. Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 Cal. 622, 299 Pac. 720 (1931) ; Bohan v. Port
Jervis Gas Light Co., 122 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246 (1890); Ohio Stock Food Co. v. Gint-
ling, 22 Ohio App. 82, 153 N.E. 341 (1926) ; Joyce, LAw OF NuisAces § 18 (1905) ; ef.
Woo, LAw OF NuisAxces § 130 (3d ed. 1893).
135. As by injunction. See Kall v. Carruthers, 59 Cal. App. 555, 211 Pac. 43 (1922);
Rindge v. Sargent, 64 N.H. 294, 9 At!. 723 (187) ; cf. Smith, Reaso:able Use of One's
O=3 Property as a Justification for Damages to a Neighbor, 17 Co. L REv. 333 (1917);
Notes, 52 CoL L. REv. 781 (1952), 61 HAav. L. Rm. 515, 520 (1948).
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offers a tempting analogy to a wilful or intentional wrong (to which, as we
have seen, contributory negligence is not a defense 130). And sometimes the
analogy may be apt enough.13 7 By no means all cases of this kind of private
nuisance, however, involve the cavalier or deliberate willingness to inflict in-
jury that would warrant treating the wrong as intentional. It is true that most
of these defendants intend to do the very thing that causes the injury. But
their attitude is often no more reprehensible or anti-social than the decision
to run a railroad or a fleet of trucks in the face of statistical certainty that the
enterprise will take a toll of life and limb. A sounder basis for excluding con-
tributory negligence here is to treat defendant's activities in these cases as the
kind one engages in at peril of having to compensate his neighbors for any
unreasonable interference which his activities cause to their enjoyment of their
own land. 3 8 This would account for those decisions which rule out the defense
where defendant's conduct involves merely negligence, 13 9 as well as those
which make him pay damages where his activity, though injurious, is never-
theless so valuable to society that it will not be enjoined.1 40 Neither of these
results may be satisfactorily explained by resort to the analogy of wilfulness.
There is another reason why contributory negligence is insignificant in these
cases. They seldom in fact present any act or omission on plaintiff's part
136. See text at pages 707-9 supra.
137. E.g., Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890) (wherein the complaint
characterized defendant's maintenance of the offending pipe as "wilfully, wrongfully, and
maliciously" done). Compare PROSsER, ToRTs 597 (1941).
138. See HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 181 (1933). As we have seen (pages 712-15
supra), the philosophy behind this kind of liability leaves little room for fault on either
defendant's or plaintiff's side of the scale.
139. E.g., Philadelphia & R.R. v. Smith, 64 Fed. 679 (3d Cir. 1894) (allowing drain-
age ditch to become clogged) ; Missouri K. & T.R.R. v. Burt, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 27
S.W. 948 (1894) (leaving dead animal to rot on right of way) ; cf. Kafka v. Bozio, 191
Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 753 (1923) (contributory negligence no defense to nuisance apparently
created by negligence). In Gould v. McKenna, 86 Pa. 297 (1878), defendant's tin roof
sloped towards plaintiff's wall along which he had turned up the tin to a distance of 12
inches "as an apron or flushing." During heavy rain, water accumulated and overflowed
or came through this flashing, and entered plaintiff's building. Under the charge, the jury
must have found that defendant failed to protect this party wall "in a manner in which a
,prudent or cautious man would for this purpose." See id. at 300. The court held contri-
butory negligence no defense.
It is often said that contributory negligence is a defense to a nuisance arising out of
negligence. See, e.g., HARPER, LAW OF ToRrs 394 (1933). But this should not be true of
a case where defendant would be liable for the condition he created even if there were
no negligence. Where defendant is strictly liable, though innocent, his defenses are surely
not increased by adding his negligence to the case. The statement referred to, I submit,
has no proper application to the field of private nuisance.
140. See, e.g., Rasch v. Nassau El. Co., 198 N.Y. 385, 91 N.E. 785 (1910); Story
v. N.Y. El. Ry., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882) ; Barboglio v. Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 Pac. 385
(1923); Note, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 COL. L. REv. 781, 784 (1952) ;
James, Nature of Negligence, 4 UTAH L. REv.-(1953). These cases do not involve the
defense of contributory negligence.
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which is comparable to contributory negligence in the ordinary accident case.
This will be seen from a review of the kinds of situations where defendant has
sought to invoke the defense. These include: (1) "Moving to a nuisance"-
e.g., buying or renting property exposed to the nuisance. If such conduct on
plaintiff's part deprived him of his remedy, that fact would virtually allow de-
fendant, by his wrongful conduct, to condemn part of the value of neighboring
land without compensation. It is not a defense. 4' (2) Use by plaintiff of his
own land in a way that foreseeably increases his exposure to the nuisance. As
a general proposition the law is unwilling to characterize such conduct as negli-
gent (even where contributory negligence would concededly be a defense). 12
To do so would require plaintiff to make an unreasonable sacrifice to avoid
the consequences of an admitted wrong. He would have to refrain, for in-
stance, from planting to crops that part of his land which was threatened with
flood by defendant's inadequate culvert,143 or to keep his windows forever
closed to keep out the stench or smoke from defendant's factory.244 Such sacri-
fices the law does not require. (3) Creation of a similar nuisance by plaintiff.
Here of course, plaintiff may not recover for any damages that result from
the condition which he himself has created, but his conduct does not bar him
from recovering for that part of the damages which flow from the condition
which defendant created. 45 (4) Failure to take reasonable steps to avert or
minimize the consequences of the nuisance, or to abate the nuisance. These
cases present the closest analogy to ordinary contributory negligence, and here
that doctrine can make the most plausible claim for recognition. But the weight
of authority rejects the defense even here, often quoting a passage from Wood
that "[a] party is not bound to expend a dollar, or to do any act to secure for
himself the exercise or enjoyment of a legal right of which he is deprived by
reason of the wrongful acts of another."'146 This expresses a policy to put on
defendants in these cases the primary burden of protecting others from the
consequences of conduct or a condition that amounts to a nuisance. Thus
plaintiff is not bound to abate the nuisance (especially if this would involve
141. HAPc._E, LAW OF Tors § 193 (1933); JoYcE- Lxw. OF XIsA:,ces §49 (li ).
142. Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914 : Taul1Le v.
Campbell, 241 Ky. 410, 44 S.W.2d 275 (1931); North Bend L. Co. v. Seattle, 116 Wash.
500, 199 Pac. 988, 19 A.L.R. 415, 423 (1921); Kellogg v. Chicago & N.W.R.R.., 2A Wiz.
223 (1870). But cf. Willitts v. Chicago B. & K.C. Ry., 83 Iowa 281, 55 N.W. 313 (1893);
Emry v. Raleigh & G.R.R., 109 N.C. 5S9, 14 S.E. 352 (1S91); Smith v. Ogden & N.V.
R.R., 33 Utah 129, 93 Pac. 185 (1907).
143. As in the cases cited in the preceding note.
144. See Curtis v. Kastner, 220 Cal. 185, 30 P.2d 26, 29 (1934).
145. Bowman v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa 234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906). Compare Guiuld
v. McKenna, 86 Pa. 297 (1878). Compare also Rozewski v. Simpson, 9 Cal.2d 515, 71
P.2d 72 (1937) (water carefully impounded on defendant's rice field escaped onto plaintiff's
land through cuts made by plaintiff himself).
146. WooD, LAw OF NuISA-cEs § 435 (3d ed. 1,693).
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going on defendant's land), even though he is privileged to do So,147 Nor need
he take affirmative steps to arrange his premises so as to ward off the nuisance,
as by making an embankment or fixing a wall to prevent seepage of water
from defendant's land. 148 Another way to express the result in these cases is
to say that plaintiff has no duty (or at least a limited duty) of self-protective
care with respect to risks created by a nuisance. 49
No doubt in all these situations there are limits to the principle which ex-
cludes plaintiff's acts or omissions as a defense. Surely if that conduct amounts
to consent or invitation to injury, or a wilful or reckless and unreasonable ex-
posure to risk, that fact should preclude recovery for the item of damages
(which might in a given case include all damages) resulting from such conduct
on plaintiff's part.150
All of the nuisance cases heretofore dealt with involved interference with
the use and enjoyment of land, a field in which strict liability has, traditionally,
147. Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle, 177 Ind. 292, 98 N.E. 60 (1912) ; White v. Chapin, 102
Mass. 138 (1869) ; Jarvis v. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R., 26 Mo. App. 253 (1887) ; Missouri
K. & T.R.R. v. Burt, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 27 S.W. 948 (1894); Gulf C. & S.F.R.R.
v. Reed, 22 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
148. Philadelphia & R.R.R. v. Smith, 64 Fed. 679 (3d Cir. 1894) ; Tennessee Coal &
I. Co. v. Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252, 14 So. 167 (1893); Athens Mfg. Co. v. Rucker, 80 Ga.
291, 4 S.E. 885 (1887); T. A. Snider Preserve Co. v. Beemon, 60 S.W. 849 (Ky. Ct. of
App. 1901); Underwood v. Waldron, 33 Mich. 232 (1876); Paddock v. Somes, 102 Mo,
226, 14 S.W. 746 (1890) ; Gould v. McKenna, 86 Pa. 297 (1878). Rut cf. Carroll Springs
Dist. Co. v. Schnepfe, 111 Md. 420, 74 Atl. 828 (1909).
149. See reasoning of Cooley, C.J., in Underwood v. Waldron, 33 Mich. 232 (1876).
150. In Sherman v. Fall R. Iron Wks. Co., 2 Allen 524 (Mass. 1861), gas escaping
from defendant's pipes fouled the well used by plaintiff in his livery business. In holding
that plaintiff had made a case for the jury, the court said, "If the injury to the plaintiff's
horses, and to his business, was occasioned by his own carelessness in allowing the horses
to drink the water after he knew that it was corrupted by the gas, the effect would only be
to exclude that particular element of damages." Id. at 526. See also Willitts v. Chicago,
B. & K C. Ry., 88 Iowa 281, 55 N.W. 313 (1893) ; Ernry v. Raleigh & G.R.R., 109 N,C,
589, 14 S.E. 352 (1891).
It has been suggested that if a man "purchases land for the sole purpose of bringing
an action against the defendant for a nuisance . ..he may be denied a remedy. .... "
HARPER, LAw oF ToRTs 394 (1933). Such a result, however, seems highly questionable
in policy, since it would adversely affect the innocent former owner of the injured land
by further impairing its already damaged marketability. Even in "moving to a nuisance,"
however, plaintiff's conduct is not altogether irrelevant. If, for instance, he chooses to
build a home in the heart of an industrial area he must put up with more discomfort than
if he lived in the country. Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAmD. L.J. 189, 200 (1931).
Compare also discussion of the Cape Town Tramways case, cited and discussed in note
125 supra.
It should be noted that assumption of risk in a primary sense could come into a case
of private nuisance only where plaintiff obtained his interest in land from the defendant
himself, with knowledge of the nuisance. Otherwise the relationship between the parties
is not of the kind in which such assumption of risk is relevant. See James, Assunption
of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
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been more readily applied than in other cases of personal injury and property
damage.15' The concept of nuisance has also been used where defendant's
conduct unreasonably interferes with the exercise of a public right such as
navigation or highway travel. And such a nuisance may afford an action for
damages to one who suffers individual injury (e.g., personal injury or property
damage) from the nuisance.' 2 The situations in this field are of the type ordi-
narily found in accident litigation and abound with examples of conduct (by
plaintiffs) involving typical contributory negligence, such as failure to observe
and avoid apparent danger. It is here that the greatest confusion and diversity
of views are found.'5 3
Nuisance is an older tort than. negligence, but it has always been a broad
and amorphous one.1 4 As late as the nineteenth century, negligence was
thought of as simply one way of committing one of the recognized torts-for
example, nuisanceY1' This was the situation when contributory negligence
appeared on the scene. Quite naturally, therefore, it was looked on as a defense
to negligence wherever that was relied on as a ground of liability in any tort
-including nuisance.25' As the century wore on the tendency grew (especial-
ly in America) to look on negligence as the normal basis of liability in cases
of accidental personal injury and property damage.157 It is not surprising,
therefore, to find our courts applying the companion notion of contributory
negligence in these cases Without attaching any particular significance to the
fact that in many of them defendant's conduct alsb amounted to a nuisance.)1
151. All the instances of strict liability relied on by the judges in Rylands v. Fletcher,
L.R. 1 E. 265 (1866), aff'd, LR. 3 H.L 330 (188), for example, involved injury to
interests in land. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylan:ds z. Fletchlwr, 59 U. o0" PA. L Riv. 293,
373, 423 (1911). See also James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Dcv ?lo :J-;.ms, 55
YALt L.J. 365, 366 et seq. (1946). Occasionally, of course, a private nuisance may cause
personal injury to plaintiff or damage to his chattels while he is in the e:.ercie of an intrtimt
in land. Fumes from a factory, for e.-ample, may make a neighbor ill. It has begn sug-
gested that the same rules be applied here, to the defense of contributory negligence, as
are found in cases of public nuisance causing such injury. Comment, 24 I-.-p. J, 402,
411 n.40 (1949). Since liability in private nuisance is strict, this would lead to e.%clusi_,1
of the defense in such case.
152. HAMPmR, LAW oF TO.RTs § 179 (1933) ; ProssF , ToTs § 72 (1933) ; Corrm et.
24 IxD. L.J. 402 (1949).
153. See Berger, Contributory Aegligence as a Defense to Nu11isance, 29 Ilu. L Rzv.
372 (1934) ; Comment, Nuisance or Negligence; A Study in the Tyran:y of Labcls, 24
I D. L.J. 402 (1949); Notes, 35 MIcH. L. R v. 6S4 (1937), 38 MicH. L RMv 1337
(1940), 19 .Mxx. L. REv. 249 (1935), 57 A.L.R. 7 (192).
154. Prosser, Auisance Without Fault, 20 Tr-x. L. REv. 399, 410 (1942) ; Winfield,
Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAsmn L.J. 189 (1931).
155. Id. at 197; Winfield, History of Negligence in Torts, 42 L.Q. Rnv. 184 (1926).
156. As in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. IS9),
which is often referred to as the parent of all contributory negligence cases.
157. See Bohlen, supra note 151; James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Dvlop-
ments, 55 YALE L.J. 365 (1946).
158. E.g., Pfau v. Reynolds, 53 Ill. 212 (1370) ; Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 2,30 (lid
1847) ; Casey v. Malden, 163 Mass. 507, 40 N.E. 849 (1895); Smith v. Smith, 2 PicIL
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And today where a nuisance is grounded on negligence, contributory negli-
gence is generally held to be a defense. 15
A public nuisance, however, may also be grounded on some foundation of
liability other than negligence. Defendant's conduct may involve extra-hazard-
ous activity (like blasting) or the violation of a positive rule of law or a statute
(such as the unlawful obstruction or excavation of the highway) and there-
fore be a nuisance. And very occasionally defendant may intend the harm as
well as the obstruction. The weight of current authority characterizes all such
nuisances as "absolute," and holds that ordinary contributory negligence is
no defense to actions based on them 160 (though wilful or reckless exposure
to risk would be 101).
It remains to analyze and appraise the current distinction between nuisance
grounded on negligence and absolute nuisance. Some aspects of it are easy
enough to fit into the prevailing patterns of negligence law and are as justifi-
able as their analogues outside of the nuisance area. Thus, as we have seen,
contributory negligence is generally no defense where defendant's activity is
extra-hazardous, and there is no reason for applying a different rule where the
term nuisance is used as a vehicle of strict liability in these cases.' 02 The same
thing would be true in the rare case where the harmful result is intended.
On the other hand where defendant's conduct is actionable only because it
entails an unreasonable likelihood of harm under all the circumstances-but
not so great a likelihood that the conduct will be called wanton-it certainly
violates no legal logic to hold that contributory negligence is a defense, even if
the wrong fits into the technical dimensions of a nuisance. To be a nuisance
it must, it is true, unreasonably jeopardize persons exercising a public right,
621 (Mass. 1823). See Note, 29 ILL. L. REv. 372 (1934). In Crommelin v. Coxe, 30 Ala,
318 (1857), a much mis-cited case, the court apparently accepted this notion quite readily
(id. at 329), but found it inapplicable to a case where plaintiff failed to fill in a space
with earth so as to protect his own land from water seeping from his neighbor's, The
actual holding of the case was that defendant was not liable for a condition he had no part
in creating (excavation that collected water).
159. The leading case is 'McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E, 391
(1928). See also Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.2d 775 (1942) ; and authori-
ties cited in note 153 supra.
160. Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499 (1931); Flaherty v. Great
Northern R.R., 218 Minn. 488, 16 N.W.2d 553 (1944); Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381,
279 N.W. 227 (1938); Delaney v. Philhern Realty H. Corp., 280 N.Y. 461, 21 NE.2d
507 (1939) ; Clifford v. Dam, 81 N.Y. 52 (1880) ; and authorities cited in note 153 supra.
161. Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 118 At. 467 (1922). Most of the cases cited in
the preceding note recognize this. Compare also note 126 supra.
162. Winfield, has said, "[L]et us select what description of nuisance we may, we
shall find that it will always cover the type of evil contemplated in Rylands v. Fletcher."
Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAmB. L.J. 189, 194 (1931). Especially in America, where
the Rylands case got a cold initial reception, nuisance is a much worked vehicle for the
growing recognition of strict liability for extra-hazardous activities. See, e.1., Prosser,
Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tax. L. REv. 399 (1942) ; SHULMAN & JAMES, CAs S AND
MATERlALS ON ToRTs 61-82 (2d ed. 1952).
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but careless automobile driving does the same thing. A nuisance must also
be produced by affirmative conduct (in many states), 1, but so are many con-
ditions that are actionable only under the head of negligence. A nuisance is
usually a static and more or less permanent condition,'0 4 but many a wear-
and-tear defect in a highway and many a danger on private premises have
that quality too. A negligent nuisance may often carry far less threat of danger
than many negligent acts or omissions that are not nuisances. All in all, there
is nothing about the characteristics of such a nuisance, either singly or in com-
bination, that affords a basis in formal logic for distinguishing it from other
negligent conduct. If, therefore, contributory negligence represents a valid
policy, it would be capricious to exclude it as a defense here. The weight of
authority does not do so.' 65
So far the distinctions seem rational enough, but there is more trouble in
finding a reason to distinguish betAven merely negligent nuisances and those
which involve violation of statute or ordinance. Generally the violation of a
safety statute is treated as negligence to which contributory negligence is a
defense.16' Yet it is also true in cases where civil damages are sought for a
public nuisance that the real significance of the statute lies in its safety aspect
and the unreasonable likelihood of harm created by its breach. If that were not
so, civil liability would be imposed here on a basis closely akin to the general-
ly discredited "outlaw" theory.0 7  Moreover the statutory breach may involve
conduct or a condition no more dangerous than the negligent nuisance. In-
deed the hole dug in the highway without permit, but fully guarded and lighted,
may be less dangerous than the permitted excavation carelessly left without
lights or guards. On any basis of logical consistency, therefore, contributory
negligence should be a defense here 1'8 except where the breach of statute in-
volves extra-hazardous or wanton and wilful conduct.
Some cases justify the finding of an absolute nuisance by stressing the in-
tent to violate the statute-thereby assimilating defendant's conduct to wilful-
ness. 6 9 But this confuses intent to do an act with intent to do the harm that
163. See, e.g., Crommelin v. Coxe, 30 Ala. 318 (1857): Bacon v. Ro1,cry Hill, 126
Conn. 402, 11 A2d 399 (1940).
164. See Prosser, Nuisance TVithout Fault. 20 TEX. L. REr. 399, 402 n.3 (1942);
James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Devlopments 55 Y.= LJ. 365, 369 (1946).
165. See notes 153 and 159 supra.
166. Prosser, Contributor, Negligence as a Defense to 1iolation of Statute, 32 M ln.
L. Rzv. 105 (1948) ; Note, 15 U. oF Cm. L. RV. 779 (194S).
167. See note 46 supra.
168. And some courts have 3ielded to the claims of consistency. Curtis v. Castner,
220 Cal. 185, 30 P.2d 26 (1934). Contrast with this view Casey v. Malden, 163 Mass.
507, 40 N.E. 849 (1895) ; Pfau v. Reynolds, 53 Ill. 212 (1870) (which apparently ignore
the distinction, though it seems not to have been urged). On the other hand, New Jersey
has apparently resolved the dilemma here by precluding the defense of ordinary contri-
butory negligence from all cases of public nuisance. Hammond v. Monmouth County, 117
N.J.L. 11, 186 AtI. 452 (Sup. Ct 1936), 35 Mxcu. L. REV. 64 (1937).
169. See Flaherty v. Great Northern R.R., 218 Minn. 4SRS, 16 N.W.2d 553 (1944);
Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 279 N.V. 227 (1938).
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flows from it.170 Many motor vehicle cases, for example, involve intent to do
an act that breaks a statute, but this is uniformly treated as no more than negli-
gence unless the conduct intended-in addition to being unlawful-is preg-
nant with danger so manifest that the intent to engage in it involves wanton-
ness. 171 -ere as under the "outlaw" theory it may reasonably be urged that
any deviation from ordinary negligence principles involves a use of civil re-
covery to punish a wrongdoer in a manner not provided by the legislature.
The reasoning of the last two paragraphs, however, all proceeds on the as-
sumption that contributory negligence represents enough of a valid policy so
that it should be applied wherever consistency demands. This assumption-
and therefore the reasoning-is probably false, 172 and this may well be why
so many courts apply the notion of "absolute nuisance" broadly to cases where
breach of statute or ordinance is involved.173 Indeed the tendency is to extend
the concept still further, thereby cutting down even more the harsh and out-
grown defense of contributory negligence. Thus Connecticut courts hold that
even where no statute is involved the nuisance is "absolute" so long as defendant
intended to create the very condition that is found to involve negligence and
therefore (if other tests are met) to constitute a nuisance.
17 4
170. See Prosser, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Violation of Statute, 32
MINN. L. REv. 105, 112-3 (1948) ("The intent which will preclude the defense of contri-
butory negligence is not the intent to do an act, or to do a forbidden act; it is the intent
to do harm to another, or to invade his rights."). See also James, Accident Liability.
Sowe Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 365, 367 (1946).
171. An example may be found in Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, Inc.,
64 Ariz. 101, 166 P.2d 816 (1946) ; see note 96 supra.
172. See, e.g., Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts 1, 27 HARv. L. Riv.
235, 243 (1914) ("A decadent doctrine which will ultimately disappear from the law.") ;
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317, 342 (1914) ("The de-
fense itself is crumbling at many points under attacks both legislative and judicial.");
Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1946);
James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REV. 769, 786
et seq. (1950).
173. Most of the cases cited in note 140 supra, are of this type. Delaney v. Philhern
Realty H. Corp., 280 N.Y. 461, 21 N.E.2d 507 (1939), involved two possible theories
of liability, viz., (1) that a pipe had been laid across the sidewalk without a permit, (2)
that the pipe was covered by permit but that the boards that flanked it had been carelessly
laid. The Court of Appeals said: "If no license has been issued, then an obstruction in the
public way is an absolute nuisance ... whereas if a permit has been issued but the privi-
lege to obstruct the public way is exercised in an improper manner, then the resulting
nuisance is of a kind which arises out of negligence." Id. at 465; 21 N.E2d at 509.
174. De Lahunta v. Waterbury, 134 Conn. 630, 59 A.2d 800 (1948) ; Beckwith v.
Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.2d 775 (1942) ; Werner, Public Nuisance in Personal In-
jury Actions in Cmnecticut, 15 CONN. B.J. 199 (1941) ; Mignone, Nuisance and Negli-
gence, 11 CoNNi. B.J. 209 (1937) ; James, Chief Justice Maltbie and the Law of Negli-
gence, 24 CONN. B.J. 61, 73 et seq. (1950); Comment, Nuisance or Negligence: A Study
in the Tyranny of Labels, 24 IND. L.J. 402 (1949). Compare United El. Light Co. v.
Deliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N.E.2d 553 (1943) (for a similar abuse of the notion
of "intent" to broaden strict liability) ; and Hammond v. Monmouth County, 117 N.J.L.
11, 186 Atl. 452 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (which would apparently exclude ordinary contributory
negligence in all public nuisance cases).
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Violation of statute. The question may also arise whether contributory
negligence is a defense to an action based on the violation of statute. If the
statute is one expressly providing for civil recovery, the answer is to be found
either in the words of the act 17 (if they provide an answer) or in construction
of the statute in the light of its purpose.176 In the case of a purely criminal
statute where the basis for recovery is negligence (in failing to satisfy the
statutory standard of conduct), contributory negligence is generally a de-
fense.' 7 7 It will not be, however, where the statute is "enacted to protect a
class of persons from their inability to exercise self-protective care" against
the risks created by the statute's -iolation. 78
The Double Standard: Contributory Negligcnce and Negligence Compared
Negligence involves conduct which is fraught with unreasonable likelihood
of harm to others. Contributory negligence involves such likelihood of harm
to oneself or to one's own interests.70 In other respects, as we have seen, for-
mal reasoning treats the two concepts as being similar and parallel, although
in important respects they serve in practice diametrically opposed policies.'5 8
The result of this anomaly has been twofold: (1) underneath the formal sym-
metry a double standard has in fact been applied, wherever there is room for
elasticity within the logical framework, so as to extend the concept of negli-
gence and contract that of contributory negligence; (2) even the formal sym-
metry is beginning to break down around the edges. The examples of these
trends may best be seen by examining the requirements of and the tests for
contributory negligence.
Standards of conduct. Like negligence, contributory negligence involves
a standard of conduct which is that of the reasonably prudent person. This
test is one that has traditionally been associated under our system with the
role of the jury, and it has been increasingly administered of late so as to
invoke the jury's function.' 8' This we have seen in the recession of fixed
175. E.g., 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1946) (contributory negligence no
defense where railroad violated safety statute).
176. See Note, 15 U. or. Cm. L REv. 779 (1943).
177. Prosser, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 Mxmt.
L. REv. 105 (1948) ; Note, 15 U. or CH. L. REv. 779 (1943).
178. Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Co., 293 N.Y. 313, 315, S3 N.E2d 133, 134 (1948);
REsTATEm ET, TORTS § 483 (1934).
179. Ra-srarsax, ToRTs § 463 (1934).
180. See pages 704-6 supra.
181. For general treatments of this trend in accident cases, see Nixon, Changing Rules
of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 L.,w & CoNTiP. PrD. 476 (1936);
Searl, Automobile Liability Law De-velopment & Trend, 39 BnsT's Izxs. Nws .583 (Fire
& Cas. ed. 1938) ; James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 53 YMxa UJ.
667 (1949). See the excellent treatment in Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 Iu.. -
Ray. 116 et seq. (1944), which highlights some of the strict holdings (on contributory
negligence) in the history of Illinois accident law, and emphasizes the importance of the
jury's role here.
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standards set by the court (such as the stop, look, and listen, and the range of
vision rules)'8 2 and in the growth of the "emerging doctrine of justifiable vio-
lation"' 83 in states where breach of a safety statute is negligence per so. Other
examples include the leniency with which momentary forgetfulness or inadver-
tence is viewed,18 4 or the excuses for encountering unknown dangers.18 5 These
tendencies do not upset formal symmetry because they expand the jury's func-
tion on both sides of the scale. But the jury will exercise its function-in
the generality of cases-so as to expand liability and cut down the defense.' 88
"In the sort of case that commonly presents itself a jury will be
quick enough to find'against a defendant whose illegal conduct has
caused the injury .... But when the plaintiff's conduct is in question
the harshness of contributory negligence as a defense and the relative
situation of the parties often makes the jury grasp at any opportunity
to exonerate the plaintiff of negligence even though he broke the
law.'
1 87
The reasonable man standard is undergoing another change which has the
same net effect. There is some tendency to relax the rigors of its objectivity
and to take into account the individual shortcomings of the party concerned.18,
Some courts have frankly done this for the plaintiff and not for the defendant
-notably where the infirmities of youth, old age, or insanity are concerned.180
But even where there is no such open breach with formal consistency, the prag-
matic result has been pretty much the same because only plaintiffs seem to be
182. See James & Sigerson, Particulari-ing Standards of Conduct in Negli, ence
Trials, 5 VAND. L. REV. 697, 705-07 (1952).
183. Morris, Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Cases, 49 CoL. L. Rim, 21, 32-4
(1949); James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. RLv.
95, 117 et seq. (1950).
184. James, Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. Rsv. 1,
7-9 (1951) ; James, Chief Justice Maltbie and the Law of Negligence, 24 CONN. B.J. 61
(1950).
185. Burk v. Corrado, 116 Conn. 511, 165 Atl. 682 (1933) ; Silvestro v. Walz, 222
Ind. 163, 51 N.E.2d 629 (1934) ; Boyce v. Brewington, 49 N.M. 107, 158 P.2d 124 (1945) ;
Huus v. Ringo, 76 N.D. 763, 39 N.W2d 505 (1949) ; Polm v. Hessioo, 363 Pa. 49-4, 70
A.2d 311 (1950) ; Note, 163 A.L.R. 587 (1946).
186. James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE LJ. 667,
687 (1949).
187. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HAIv. L. REv. 317, 340 n.68
(1914). Thayer Was writing about negligence based on violation of statute, but what 1e
said is just as applicable to common-law negligence.
188. See James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Lazo, 63 HAiv. L.
Rzv. 769, 782-6 (1950) ; James, Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negliqence Cases, 16
Mo. L. Rm 1, 2, 22-6 (1951).
189. Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (1855) ; Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 173 N.W.
437 (1919) ; Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 150 Misc. 180, 268 N.Y. Supp. 446 (Mull.
Ct. 1934); REsTATEMENT, TORTS §§654 et seq. (Supp. 1948); cf. Hill Transp, Co, v.
Everett, 145 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1944).
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widely successful in urging their own infirmities as an excuse for the accident
and injury. 9 0
Reasonableness of the risk. Contributory negligence, like negligence, must
involve a risk that is unreasonable under all the circumstances, and this tet
again generally invokes the jury's function: to find and apply the dictates of
the community conscience in the matter. 31 Moreover, some of the crystallize4l
rules that have evolved (for striking this balance) minimize contributory negli-
gence.' 92 Here, as in the case of defendant's negligence, plaintiff's conduct is
to be evaluated in its setting in the circumstances, and plaintiff will be entitled
to make assumptions that are reasonable in the light of them. Negligence on
either side of the scale is a term of relationship. Thus plaintiff may expect that
defendant will obey the law and will act as a reasonable man would, unleis
the circumstances should warn him to the contrary.'0 3 And he may likewise
assume that highways and premises ostensibly prepared for his reception are
reasonably free from defects and pitfalls. 94 Reasonable expectations of safety
are just as much a part of ordinary prudent conduct as are expectations of
danger.
Scope of the risk. Negligence, as we have seen, is actionable only on account
of harms which were within the scope of the risks that made the offending
conduct negligent. 95 Similar restrictions hem in contributory negligence.
Thus in Kinderavich v. Palner 90 the court held that plaintiff's conduct in
going upon an eastbound railroad track without looking was negligent with
respect to the hazard of being struck by an eastbound train, "but ... was un-
related to the risk of injury from being run over by another train proceeding
in the opposite direction after he had been thrown upon [another] track and
lay there [for some time] in an unconscious condition." And a plaintiff's
breach of statute will not bar him from recovery for an injury produced by
a hazard which the statute was not designed to guard against.'0 7 Here again.
while these restrictions are imposed evenhandedly by the law upon negligence
190. See Weisiger, Negligence of the Physicaily Infirm, 24 N.C.L REV. 187, 193
(1946); James, Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 .Mo. L. Rr-'..
1, 21 (1951).
191. See id. at 4; James, Arature of Aegligence, 4 UTaAH L. RL,.-(1953).
192. Such as those involving plaintiff's use of his own land in such a way as to in-
crease its exposure to risk, and those involving self-exposure in rescue cases. See James,
Nature of Negligence, 4 UTAH L. Rmv.-(1953) (particularly at nnA, 51, 55).
193. E.g., Hill v. Stringer, 116 Vt. 296, 75 A.2d 657 (1950) (pedestrian may assume
motorist's careful lookout).
194. E.g., Johnson v. Rulon, 363 Pa. 585, 70 A.2d 325 (1950), 2 .W%. L RMx. 373
(customer may assume reasonable safety of restaurant floor).
195. See James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 N.U.L. Rz'. 778 (1953).
196. 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940). The following quotation in the text is faund
id. at 98, 15 A.2d at 89-90.
197. Berry v. Sugar Notch, 191 Pa. 345, 43 Atl. 240 (1899) ; FwLurm, LAVw u Tc,.,v
§ 136 (1933) ; PRossEr, Toars 277 (1941). Cf. Mechler v. MeMahon, 124 Minn, 476, 239
N.W. 605 (1931).
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and contributory negligence, they are often administered so as to call on the
jury's function-a fact which by and large operates to favor accident vie-
tims.198
Proximate cause. The plaintiff's negligence will not bar him unless it is a
"proximate cause" of his injury.190 This means, of course, that it must be at
least a cause in fact; and the inquiry under this head is the same as the analo-
gous one under the head of defendant's negligence. This, as we have seen, is
largely concerned with the problem of proof,20 ° so that in difficult cases the
placing of the burden of proof will be determinative. It is at this point, as we shall
see, that the greatest liberalization on this cause issue has taken place. Beyond
this the concept of "proximate cause" has no more legitimate place here than
it has in connection with negligence, at least in terms of what is becoming in-
creasingly recognized as the clearer, better integrated rationalization of lia-
bility for negligence.201 Nevertheless the concept of "proximate cause" has
been and still is widely used to cut down the defense of contributory negligence
in the following ways:
(a) It is an alternative way of excluding from consideration conduct of
plaintiff that did not entail an unreasonable likelihood of the risk or hazard
that befell plaintiff. We have just noted that the limitations of the "scope of
the risk" theory are put on plaintiff's as well as defendant's negligence. Here
as elsewhere this limitation is often expressed in terms of proximate cause. 02
This is perhaps especially true where one of the risks contributing to injury
comes from an intervening force or intervening conduct of a person or an ani-
mal.203
(b) The reasoning of proximate cause has often been used to justify the
last clear chance doctrine. This often involves application of the narrow, old,
and generally discarded last wrongdoer test to the "causal" link between plain-
tiffs negligence and his own injury.
20 4
(c) The very confusion and lack of meaning in the term "proximate cause"
has sometimes allowed courts to avoid the logical consequences of an undesir-
198. See notes 186 and 187 supra.
199. REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 465 (1934). Compare note 27 supra and accompanying
text.
200. James & Perry, Legal Caue, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 762-83 (1951).
201. See id. at 762 n.4 for a collection of many of the authorities. See also Scavey,
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COL. L. Ray. 20, 52 HAiW. L. REV. 372, 48
YALE L.J. 390 (1939).
202. E.g., Hoadley v. International Paper Co., 72 Vt. 79, 47 Adt. 169 (1899); Sutton
v. Wanwatosa, 29 Wis. 21 (1871). See Green, Contributory Negligence atd Proximate
Cause, 6 N.C.L. REv. 3 (1927).
203. See James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 792-4 (1951).
204. James, Last Clear Chance: At Transitimal Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938);
PRossER, TORTS § 54 (1941). Cf. Lord Wright, Contributory Negligence, 13 MoD. L. REv.




able doctrine when they are unwilling to repudiate it or to undertake the in-
tellectual rigor required for working out rational exceptions to it. This may
happen, for example, where plaintiff has violated a statute and the court feels
committed to a strict version of the negligence per se rule.2-°
The rule of avoidable consequences. While contributory negligence, in
cases where it applies, is a complete defense to the recovery of damages to
which such negligence contributes, these may not be all the damages which
plaintiff has suffered from a single impact or injury. Plaintiff's negligence
may have contributed only to some items of such damage, and if so it will bar
recovery for those items only, where there is any practical basis for apportion-
ing them.20 6 This situation may arise in one of three ways.
After the original impact or injury (to which plaintiff's negligence did not
contribute), plaintiff's negligence may intervene to aggravate its consequences.
Thus he may neglect or carelessly treat a wound, so that it gets infected and
he loses his limb or his life.2-0 7 Or he may fail to take reasonable steps to
protect property damaged or exposed by defendant's negligence.2 -3 In cases
like these plaintiff may not recover for that aggravation to his injury toward
which his negligence contributes. This notion is sometimes referred to as the
"duty" to mitigate damages or the rule of avoidable consequences.!Y13
In a second class of cases, defendant's negligence (or wrong) and plaintiff's
negligence each cause some separable damage to plaintiff.2 1 ° This is not really
a case of contributory negligence (or fault) at all but rather one in which each
party is responsible for that part of the damage his own act caused. Bowman
v. Humphrey 21 1 is such a case. There each party separately polluted a strean
205. E.g., Hinton v. Southern R.R., 172 N.C. 5,7, 90 S.E. 756 (1916), discussed in
Green, supra note 204, at 19-21. See also James, Statutory Standards as:d Negligcnee it
Accident Cases, 11 LA. L R-v. 95, 121 (1950).
206. McCor.znac,, LAw or DAMXAGES c. 5 (1935); Pnossn , To-ars 397-400 (1941);
REsTAT T, ToRTs § 918 (1934).
207. McCoiaac, LAw or DAMAGES § 36 (1935) ; REsTATEz-iEx.T, Ton s § 918, ill. 1
(1934). As McCormick points out, serious questions may arise as to when reasonable
prudence requires plaintiff to undergo an operation. See also Lange v. Hoyt, 114 Conn.
590, 159 Ati. 575 (1932) (belief in Christian Science may warrant failure to get medical
or surgical aid).
208. E.g., Thompson v. DeLong, 267 Pa. 212, 110 At. 251 (1920) (failure to pro-
tect or remove goods threatened by dampness because of removal of party wall); RE-
sTA-ESI-NT, ToRTs § 918, ills. 2, 3 (1934).
In this connection, however, it must be remembered (1) that the courts are reluctant
to require plaintiff to take onerous steps or to forego for long the beneficial use of his
own property even where defendant's vrong amounts only to negligence (see pages 717-13
supra) ; (2) where defendant's wrong is nuisance or trespass, there is a distinct dis-
position to impose the burden of protecting plaintiff upon the defendant, rather than upn
plaintiff himself. See pages 717-18 supra; McCo mcsK, LAw or DAMAGES § 37 (1935).
209. McCorascx, LAw or DAS AGES c. 5 (1935) ; P~ossES, Torts 397 c seq. (1941);
RrsTA Ea.NT, TORTS § 918 (1934). See note S9 supra.
210. See page 717 supra.
211. 132 Iowa 234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906) ; see note 145 supra and accompanying tet.
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which flowed through lands of each. Plaintiff, the lower riparian owner, re-
covered for the pollution caused by defendant.
The most difficult question is presented by those cases in which plaintiff's
conduct is negligent with respect to one kind of risk but not with respect to
another kind, and where both risks emanate from defendant's negligence and
each inflicts some injury on plaintiff. Four Connecticut cases pose the prob-
lem and its pitfalls. In Sinithwick v. Hall & Upson Co.,212 plaintiff, who was
helping to fill an ice house from a platform, was told to keep off the unfenced
half of the platform because of the danger of falling. He was hurt when, be-
cause of defendant's negligence, the wall of the building collapsed largely on
the unfenced portion of the scaffold, and he fell to the ground. The court held
that plaintiff's conduct did not prevent recovery, since peril from the wall was
not a risk which made it negligent to stand where he did. Defendant urged
that if plaintiff had stayed where he should he would not have fallen. The
court answered that if that were true it would affect the amount of recovery
only, and would not bar the action. Quite consistent with this reasoning is
Kinderavich v. Palner 213 (discussed above 214) wherein plaintiff's negligence
would prevent recovery for injury from the eastbound train but not from the
later westbound train. The symmetry of these cases is marred by Mahoney v.
Beatman.215 There plaintiff was driving at an excessive speed when defen-
dant's oncoming car suddenly swerved over onto its wrong side of the high-
way and struck plaintiff's car. This collision was trivial and caused only slight
damage. Because of plaintiff's excessive speed, however, his car went out of
control after the collision and ended up by striking a stone wall and tree a
considerable distance away so that his automobile was badly damaged. The
court wrote a learned and confusing dissertation on proximate cause and held
in effect that since plaintiff's negligence did not contribute to the original im-
pact and did not intervene thereafter it should not stand in the way of full re-
covery for all damage. Justice Maltbie dissented. The result has been widely
criticized and seems quite inconsistent with the other Connecticut cases and
the reasoning which generally prevails in this country today,210 The rule
212. 59 Conn. 261, 21 At. 924 (1890).
213. 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83 (1940). Consistent also is the substantive law in
Deutsch v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 490, 119 AtI. 891 (1923), where a trolley ran down
a careless pedestrian and the motorman injured him again in trying to extricate him from
his position of danger. While the company was theoretically liable for the second in-
jury, it had a directed verdict because plaintiff was unable to prove how much of his total
injury was attributable to the second phase of the tragedy.
214. See text at page 725 suPra.
215. 110 .Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762 (1929).
216. See Wright v. Illinois & M.T. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); O'Keefe v. Kansas
C.W.R.R., 87 Kan. 322, 124 Pac. 416 (1912); Gregory, Justice Maltbic's Dissent in
Mahoney v. Beatman, 24 CONN. BJ. 78 (1950) ; HAlPER, LAw OF ToRTs § 134 (1933);
PRossER, ToRTs 399 (1941). Green's halfhearted defense of the case is probably the
weakest thing he ever wrote. Green, Mahoney v. Beatnan: A Study in Proximate Cause,
39 YALF L.J. 532 (1930); cf. Green, Proxiate Cauese it; Conneclicut Negligence Law,
24 CONN. B.J. 24, 45 (1950).
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against excessive speed cannot protect a driver from having an oncoming car
turn suddenly into him, but it surely is designed to protect him from loss of
control in all sorts of traffic situations, including collisions. By all that is logical
the excessive speed should have barred recovery for the damage done when
the car hit the stone wall and the tree because it went out of control. The de-
cision can be justified, if at all, only by the notion that a bad reason is good
enough to use in knocking down a bad defense.
In all these situations where plaintiff's negligence will bar recovery for some
-but not all---of his damages lurk serious problems of proof. We have al-
ready dealt elsewhere with these problems generaly. 2 17 But again it should be
noted that in cases where such problems are difficult, the question of who has
the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence may be of the
greatest importance.
Some Ameliorating Rules of Substance and Procedure
Burden of proof. The older rule, which prevailed in New York, the New
England states, and a few others, put the burden of pleading2 18 and prov-
ing 2 19 freedom from contributory negligence (in negligence cases) on the
plaintiff. In other jurisdictions the burden of pleading and proving contri-
butory negligence has always rested on defendant.2 ° The reasoning in sup-
port of the older rule was largely circular. judge Cooley said, for instance.
that the gravamen of plaintiff's "complaint is that he has been damnified by
the wrongful and negligent action of the defendant, without having contributed
thereto by negligent conduct of his own. The absence of contributory negli-
gence is therefore a part of his case. .. ."2 Obviously the second part of this
statement would follow from the first-indeed it is almost a restatement of
it-but we are given no help in seeing why the first part should be accepted.
It would be just as logical-and just as circular-to say that the gist of plain-
tiff's complaint is injury done to him by defendant's wrong and that there-
fore it is part of defendant's defense to show contributory negligence.-
217. James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 762-83 (1951). And c-mpare
note 213 supra.
218. See CLAP.R, CODE PLEADING 303 ct seq. (2d ed. 1947) ; Note, 33 LR.A. (u.s.)
1085, 1152 (1911).
219. Kotler v. Lally, 112 CoML '6, 151 At. 433 (1930), 44 HAnv. L REv. 292 (1930),
40 YAu LEJ. 484 (1931). A valuable and exhaustive collection of the older cases is found
in a Note, 33 LR.A. (N.s.) 1035 (1911).
220. Washington & G.R. Co. v. Gladmon, 82 U.S. 401 (1872); cases collected in
Note, 33 L.R.A. (Ns.) 1085, 1158 et scq. (1911). See H.ulp. L ,w op To:,rs § 135
(1933) ; PRossr, Toars 288 (1941).
221. Teipel v. Hilsendegen, 44 Mich. 461, 7 N.W. 82 (iSSO) (emphasis supplied).
222. Green, Illinois Negligence Law HI, 39 IL L REv. 116, 125-6 (1944). One
writer has said of the older rule: "The situation is much the same as if, in every con-
tract case, the plaintiff were required to plead and prove his freedom from insanity."
Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI-KE NT REv. 189, 200 (1950).
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Neither statement explains anything. The fact is that the divergent rules re-
flected divergent policies and attitudes towards the substantive defense. "It
[was] a mere question of fairness, of justice, as between the parties."223 And
the views differed, among our states, as to what this was.
The choice of rules made relatively little practical difference where there
was direct or adequate circumstantial evidence as to plaintiff's conduct at the
time of the accident.224 Under the older rule, it is true, plaintiff bore the risk
of ultimate non-persuasion, but this applied-even theoretically-only to the
relatively rare case where the evidence on both sides was in equipoise. And
in any event it was to be administered by the jury. It was in the unwitnessed
accident that the bite of the old rule was felt. Where there was no proof at
all on the issue, he who had the burden of going forward with proof lost as
a matter of law. This was not infrequently the situation in death cases (and
some others), even where defendant's negligence could be shown to have con-
tributed to the injury.25
To mitigate the harshness of this result some courts permitted an inference
or presumption of due care to be drawn from the instinct of self-preserva-
tion,m6 and some relaxed the ordinary rules of evidence to allow evidence of
223. Note, 33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1085, 1099 (1911). An admirable treatment of the con-
siderations bearing on the question of fairness. may be found in Green, supra note 222,
at 126-7.
224. Except, as we have seen, where plaintiff's negligence contributed to some but
not all of his damages. See text at note 206 supra. Where the burden of proving free-
dom from contributory negligence lay on plaintiff, he was unable to recover for that part
of his damages to which his negligence did not contribute unless he could show a basis
for isolating that part. Deutsch v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 490, 119 Atl. 891 (1923).
Where, however, the burden on that issue rests on defendant, he should also have the
burden of resolving the difficulty of apportioning damages in such a case. Cf. Golden v.
Lerch Bros., 203 Minn. 211,281 N.W. 249 (1937); Note, 8 ANN. CAs. 340 (1908) ; 34 Am,
Ju. 352, 353 (1941) (where it appears that part of claim may be barred by statute of limita-
tions, defendant has burden to show how much). See also O'Keefe v. Kansas C.W.R.R.,
87 Kan. 322, 124 Pac. 416 (1912) (instruction conditioning plaintiff's recovery upon his
separating amount of damage caused by fall from damage caused by his intoxication-
which did not contribute to his fall-held error). But cf. Thane v. Scranton T. Co., 191
Pa. 249, 43 Atl. 136 (1899).
225. A dramatic case of this kind was Kotler v. Lally, 112 Conn. 86, 151 Atl. 433
(1930), 44 Hagv. L. REv. 292 (1930), 40 YAIz L.J. 484 (1931), which led to a statutory
change of the older rule. Conn. Laws 1931, § 1654c. This statute originally applied to
death actions only but was extended in 1939 to include all actions. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§7836 (1949).
226. Way v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 40 Iowa 342 (1875) ; Breker v. Rosema, 301 Mich.
685, 4 N.W.2d 57 (1942); Savage v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 391, 67 Atl. 633 (1907).
See discussion of Iowa cases in Note, 6 IowA L.J. 55 (1920). The presumption may not
be utilized in Iowa where there is direct evidence of deceased's acts. Vance v. Grohe,
223 Iowa 1109, 274 N.W. 902 (1937).
There are collections of cases in Notes, 84 A.L.R. 1221 (1933), 116 A.L.R. 340 (1938),
most of which are from jurisdictions where th/pburden of proving contributory negligence
was (and is) on defendant. Many of the states which had the harsher rule rejected the
presumption. Mullen v. Mohican Co., 97 Conn. 97, 115 Atl. 685 (1921); Newell v.
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a deceased's propensity to be careful.2 r The principal attacks upon the older
rule, however, have been made by statutes which in almost every state have
changed it, either in death cases alone or in all negligence cases.22 The over-
whelming weight of authority in this country today puts on the defendant the
burden of pleading and proving (in both senses) contributory negligence. 9
This does not mean that defendant must always introduce evidence on this
defense to have it available to him. He is entitled to the benefit of any evidence
or inferences favorable to him which appear from the presentation of plaintiff's
case (either on direct or cross-examination). -s" Indeed the plaintiff's on' n
evidence occasionally shows him to be negligent as matter of lay'.21 If it does
not, however, defendant has the risk of non-persuasion upon the issue, whether
the evidence upon it comes from his own case or his adversary's.--
Comparative or proportionml negligence. We have noted that both modern
policy and the logic of the fault principle point to a rule that plaintiff's fault-
if it is to be counted at all-ill diminish rather than defeat his recovery. It
remains to consider the extent to which such a notion has found acceptance
in our law.
First, it should be pointed out that a cruder-and perhaps simpler-way of
attacking the defense would be to rule it out altogether in cases where defen-
Cleveland C.C. & St. L.R.R., 261 Ill. 505, 104 N.E. 223 (1914); Wright v. Boston &
M.R.R., 74 N.H. 128, 65 AtI. 687 (1907); WhViwirowski v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 124
N.Y. 420, 26 N.E 1023 (1S91); Shumm v. Rutland Ry., 81 Vt. 186, 69 Ati. 945 (1903).
227. Wallis v. Southern Pac. Co., 184 Cal. 662, 195 Pac. 403 (1921); Chicago R.I.
& P.R.R. v. Clark, 108 Ill. 113 (183). See Notes, 20 CALn'. L RE%. 203 (1932), 16
ILL. L. REv. 628 (1922), 15 A.L.R. 125 (1921), 18 A.LR. 1109 (1922).
298. The rule remains unchanged by statute (except in cases of work injuries) in
Illinois, Michigan, and Rhode Island. It has been changed in Iowa as to employees and
passengers of common carriers. IOWA R. Crv. P. 97. Maine and New York have changed
it in death actions only. MAINE REv. STAT. c. 100, § 50 (1944) ; N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAw
§ 131.
Other states which once had the harsher rule have put the burden of proving contri-
butory negligence on defendant in all cases. As to Connecticut, see note 225 mspra. The
story of the Massachusetts change appears in Note, 23 B.U.L REv. 494 (1943). Older
changes are noted in Note, 33 L.R.A. (r.s.) 1035, 1214 ct scq. (1911). See also CL.ha:.
CODE PLEADING 304-5 n.72 (2d ed. 1947) ; Green, Illinois Negligence Law II, 39 ILL. L.
REV. 116, 125 -n.33 (1944).
229. For the present situation in the federal courts, see Fmn. R. Civ. P. 8(c), Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) ; CLAM, CoDE PLEADING 305-7 (2d ed. 1947).
230. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R.R. v. Reed, 36 Ind. App. 67, 75 N.E. 50 (1905);
Goldstein v. Hotel Altman, 4 N.J. Super. 78, 66 A.2d 356 (1949) ; Note, 33 LR.A. (m1s.)
1035, 1178 (1911); 38 Am. Jua. 979 (1941); 65 C.J.S. 977 (1950).
231. E.g., Polly v. Oregon S.L.R.R., 51 Idaho 453, 6 P.2d 478 (1932) (a grade cross-
ing case).
232. Thompson v. Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931); Tresise v. Ash-
down, 118 Ohio 307, 160 N.E. 898 (1928); McCracken v. Curwensville, 309 Pa. 93, 163
AtI. 217 (1932).
233. See especially pages 691, 696, 701, 704 supra.
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dant's negligence is graver than plaintiff's-which of course would still be a
form of the all-or-nothing rule. As we have seen, something like this is now
done where defendant's wrong is intentional, or wilful or wanton, and plaintiff
is merely negligent.23 4 If defendant has been merely negligent, however, there
is no room under modem American common law for this process of compari-
son. Thus plaintiff will be barred even by slight negligence if it is a proximate
cause of his injury.235 A few older cases, however, did allow the jury to com-
pare negligences and to disregard that of plaintiff where it was less than de-
fendant's.
236
A far more flexible and rational solution would be one that diminished but
did not defeat plaintiff's recovery, where his fault contributed to an injury
234. See pages 707-12 supra. Compare also those cases in which wilful or reck-
less and unreasonable self-exposure to a risk is held to be a defense though ordinary con.
tributory negligence is not. See pages 710-11, 714-15, 718 supra.
235. E.g., Atlanta & B.A.L.R.R. v. Wheeler, 154 Ala. 530, 46 So. 262 (1908) ; Astin
v. Chicago M. & St. P.R.R., 143 Wis. 477, 128 N.W. 265 (1910). Cases are collected in
a Note, 114 A.L.R. 830 (1938), which points out the analytical difference between an in-
struction to this effect and one which fails to require plaintiff's negligence to be a proxi-
mate cause of his injury. As the Note concedes, however, the distinction is blurred in
practice. The vagueness of proximate cause, I suggest, increases the confusion and in-
vites a kind of comparison of faults by comparing the directness and importance of con-
tribution to the injury. This seems to be what has taken place in Tennessee. See Turk,
Comparative Negligence on the March 11, 28 CHI-KENT REv. 189, 304 at 313-17 (1950). CI.
McCulloch v. Horton, 105 Mont. 531, 74 P.2d 1 (1937) ; Stucke v. Milwaukee & M.R.R.,
9 Wis. 202 (1859). Compare also the reasoning in last clear chance cases.
236. Some such rule was adopted in Galena & C.U.R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858),
which stressed the relativity in the concept of negligence and concluded "the degrees of
negligence must be measured, and wherever it shall appear that plaintiff's negligence is
comparatively slight, and that of the defendant gross, he shall not be deprived of his
action." The last vestiges of this ameliorating doctrine were dissipated in Lake Shore
& M.S.R.R. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894). Good accounts of this bit of
Illinois history may be found in Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36, 42
et seq. (1944) ; Turk, supra note 235, at 305 et seq.
See also Augusta & S.R.R. v. McElmurry, 24 Ga. 75 (1858); Wichita & W.R.R. v.
Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 Pac. 78 (1887) ; Comment, 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 276 (1949).
Other treatments of the problem are GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DIsTiRIo N IN
NEGLIGENCE CASES (1936); WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTMUToRY NEGLIGENCE
(1951); Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, [1941] Wxs, L. REv. 289;
Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, 7 Wis. L. REV. 222 (1932) ; Malone,
Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. Rav. 125 (1945);
Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORN LL L.Q. 333, 604 (1932);
Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv, 572, 766
(1951) ; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1953) ; Whelan, Coln-
parative Negligence, [1938] Wis. L. REV. 465.
The term "comparative negligence" is used by some writers to refer only to a rule
which disregards plaintiff's negligence where it is less than that of defendant, See Prosser,
supra, at 465 n.2. Others use the term more broadly to include also various rules for
diminishing plaintiff's damages because of his fault. E.g., GREGORY, op. cit. supra, C. VIIl;
Turk, supra, at 304.
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also caused in part by defendant's fault. Such a solution has been found in the
maritime and continental law.2 7 A scattering of Anglo-American cases chose
this solution as a matter of common law, 8 but for the most part in our juris-
prudence it has had to come-if at all-through legislation.Y2 Apportionment
of damages might take the form of an equal division of damages between two
negligent parties without any attempt to compare the degrees of their fault.
and this is the rule of the admiralty law of the United States.Y1 Most statutes.
however, go further than this and provide for apportionment of loss according
to the degrees of negligence.241 Such statutes have become pretty general in
the British Commonwealth. England herself having provided for comparative
negligence by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945.212
In this country only a handful of states have any such legislation of general
application to accident cases. Of these, the Mississippi statute is a model of
brevity and simplicity. It provides that plaintiff's contributory negligence shall
not bar recovery, "but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable" to plaintiff.24 Under a Wisconsin
statute there is to be a similar apportionment if plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence "was not as great as" defendant's; if it is as great (or greater), plain-
tiff's negligence is still a bar.2 44 Nebraska provides for comparative negligence
(apportionment) when "the contributory negligence .. .vas slight and the
negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison...."245
The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides for comparative negligence
(apportionment) in interstate railroad work injuries,2 40 and many states have
similar provisions in statutes of limited scope.2 7 Statutes of this limited type
apply to situations where there is regularly a single injured plaintiff and a
single defendant. In such a situation the broad, simple provisions of the
Federal Act or the Mississippi statute are adequate and admirable.
Statutes of general application, however, will also apply to three-and-four-
cornered accidents, where several parties are hurt and there are multiple poten-
237. Extensive accounts of this may be found in Mole &, Wilson, suprz note 236;
and Turk, supra note 235.
238. Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 C. & P. 613 (C.P. 1839); and see authrities cited nte
236 supra (the Philbrick, Turk, and Mole & Wilson articles describe early American
ventures of this kind).
239. Modern American statutes are collected in articles by Prosser and by Philbricl:
(supra note 236) and by Turk (supra note 235). W1LuIAAs, op. it. supra note 236, treats
the subject exhaustively for the various jurisdictions of the British Commnwealth.
240. See, e.g., Turk, supra note 235, at 231.
241. Examples are the Mississippi statute and the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942) ; 35 STAT. 65 (1903), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1945).
242. 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28.
243. Miss. CODE AxN. § 1454 (1942).
244. Wis. STAT. § 331.045 (1951).
245. Nan. REv.. STaT. § 25-1151 (1943).
246. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1946). This ds vut have the
limitations found in the Wisconsin and Nebraska statutes.
247. See, e.g., statutes cited in Prosser, supra note 236, at 479.
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tial claims and cross-claims. No American statute makes specific provisions
for such a situation, and the problem has apparently not proved a serious one
in practice.4 One school of thought, however, would combine comparative
negligence with a rule of contribution among tort-feasors and provide a com-
prehensive substantive and procedural scheme for handling the whole matter
in a single lawsuit.2 49 The actual result of this proposal would be a minor
tragedy in accident law. Its least serious defect would be its almost fantastic
complexity. 250 As its proponents point out, there are rational ways of mini-
mizing this, and of reducing the jury issues to manageable proportions. 51
If the system were a desirable one this objection, though serious, might not
be insurmountable. But the substance of the system is not desirable. It di-
minishes the recovery of each accident victim not only by (1) the amount re-
flecting his own contributory negligence, but also by (2) his share of liability
for the primary claims of the other persons hurt in the accident and (3) his
liability for contribution claims. This might be fair enough where individuals
only are concerned and each is paying the judgments against himself as well
as collecting those in his favor. But in the usual case today, where a man has
paid premiums to have his liabilities covered by insurance, this scheme would
cause his personal recovery (which is meant to cover part of his own loss
from the accident) to be diminished by liabilities that he has paid his in-
surance company to assume. Put another way, this would let the respective
insurance carriers credit their cross-claims amongst themselves against the
amounts they would have to pay each other's insureds-who are also victims
in the accident. This is graphically shown by a hypothetical case put by Pro-
fessor Williams in which the three drivers, A, B, and C, involved in a collision
were all equally negligent. A's initial loss was £450, B's £600, and C's £750.
Under a doctrine of comparative negligence this would entitle A to an award
of £300 against B and C; B to an award of £400 against A and C; C to an
award of £500 against A and B. 252 If each of these awards was paid by the
respective insurance companies without set-off or cross-claim, the injured per-
sons would get £1200. If the insurance companies were allowed to cancel out
claims in the way proposed, the only payment to any of the victims would be
£6150 paid by A's insurer to C.253 If the initial losses suffered by each had
been equal, the cancelling-out process would be complete.
248. Prosser notes that there are "astonishingly few cases in which the question of
multiple parties has reached the appellate court under any 'comparative negligence' act."
Prosser, .supra note 236, at 507.
249. GRE~oRy, op. cit. supra note 236; WiLUAms, op. cit. supra note 236, c. 16.
250. This consideration alone, however, seems enough to damn the scheme in Pros-
ser's eyes. Prosser, supra note 236, at 503-8.
251. GREGoRY, op. cit. mipra note 236, cc. x, xi, xii; WILLLuMs, op. cit. supra note
236, c. 16.
252. These figures represent the loss of each party diminished by 33!l percent; by
hypothesis, the negligence of each party contributed 333 percent to the injury,
253. A will have a claim of £300 against B & C, B one of £400 against A & C, C
one of £500 against A & B. Someone will have to take the initiative in satisfying his
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To a certain extent, of course, this cancelling-out process might take place
under any system of comparative negligence which retains the current fictitious
identity of insurer and insured. But with individual suits, a rule forbidding
contribution among tort-feasors, and procedural limits on defendant's ability
to bring in new parties, the opportunity for cancelling-out is impeded, and
in practice often ignored. The proposed schene would aggravate the
situation by (1) adding the substantively undesirable feature of contribution
among tort-feasors ;254 (2) affording better procedures for implementing a
vicious process--one that ignores the fact and the function of liability insur-
ance and cuts down compensation to accident victims -m by letting insurance
companies shift part of their obligation (to pay their insured's legal liabilities)
to the shoulders of accident victims.
It is a strange thing, perhaps, that the pressures towards compensating
accident victims have wrought so little formal change in the concept of con-
tributory negligence--concededly one of the weak spots in a system of liability
based on fault. Indeed, nothing dramatic has taken place here at all. There
has been no such ground swell of comparative negligence legislation in Ameri-
ca as there has in the British Commonwealth. The only significant statutory
change on any widespread basis has had to do with the burden of proof, and
that has affected only a minority of states. Yet, in spite of all this, a gradual
process of erosion has eaten away most of what was once a formidable ob-
struction to the approach towards "negligence 'without fault." This has been
very much within the tradition of our common law.; and, as so often has hap-
pened, the jury has made possible great change in fact with very little shift
in theory. It may be, as some contend, that in the long run this capacity for
growth retards comprehensive and carefully thought out chi iges to meet new
needs. Yet the gradual common-law process may well yie d a sounder and
more indigenous development, continually tempered by e,; 3erience. At any
rate, this seems to be what we are destined to enjoy-or endure-in the field
of accident liability for some time to come.
judgment. Assume it is B, who demands his £400 from A. A elects to set off his £300
claim and pays the balance of £100 to B. This will satisfy A's and B's judgment claims
and give each of them a claim for contribution (A for £200 and B for £150) against C.
C responds to these claims by putting forth his own £500 claim which not only wipas out
A's and B's claim but leaves a £150 balance due to C which A pays. A then claims con-
tribution from B. Since A has satisfied £350 of C's judgment (£200 by set-off and £150
by payment) while B has satisfied only £150 (by set-off), B owes A £100, being half the
difference. This explanation is taken from W".LIAms, op. cit. supra note 236, at 399, 400.
For other examples, see GRGORY. op. cit. supra note 236, c. x and App. A.
254. James. Contribution Anong Tort-fcasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HAnv. L.
REv. 1156 (1941).
255. Under the present system it is not at all unusual to have substantial settlements
made to both potential plaintiff and defendant.
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